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EASTERN EDUCATION JOURNAL 
T ARBLE ARTS CENTER 
One of the newest additions to the campus of 
Eastern Illinois University is the Tarble Arts Center 
located on 7th Street, south of the Buzzard Education 
Building. 
Opened in June of 1982, the TAC is the realization of 
the late Newton Tarble, who attended Eastern from 
1905 to 1909 and was the co-founder of Snap-On Tool 
Company. Tarble donated one million dollars to fund 
the project. 
According to Don Carmichael, Director of the TAC, 
one of the main purposes of the center is to generate 
educational programs in the forms of art, theater, and 
music. 
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The TAC has 11 galleries, a multi-purpose area for 
lectures and movies, and an ampitheater for concerts 
and plays. The TAC maintains major travelling exhibits 
four to six weeks in addition to its permanent exhibits. 
In the near future, the TAC will provide "Arts on 
Wheels", bringing the arts to people of east central 
Illinois. The traveling exhibit will visit public schools 
and city parks, giving people a chance to sample the 
TAC. The TAC also offers workshops and non-credit 
courses in the arts. 
Designed by E. Verner Johnson of Boston, the Tarble 
Arts Center is a very different and striking building on 
Eastern's campus-a structure of and for the arts. 
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EASTERN EDUCATION JOURNAL 
The Eastern Education Journal seeks to present 
competent discussions of contemporary issues in 
education and toward this end generally publishes 
articles written by persons active in the profession of 
education who have developed degrees of expertise 
through preparation and experience in the field . 
We are currently soliciting articles . All varieties of 
manuscript will be accepted. Research summaries, 
program descriptions, and book reviews are considered 
worthy; the Editorial Board, however, will give priority 
to original points of view and strong personal position 
papers . Controversy is welcome, and the editors hope 
to present a balance of pro and con articles on current 
issues in education. Manuscripts must be submitted to 
the Editor, Ronald Leathers, School of Education, 
Eastern Illinois University. 
1. Manuscript size should be limited to 3000 words or 
less. It should be typed, double spaced, on 8½ by 11 
paper. Footnotes should be kept to a minimum, and all 
references must appear at the end of the article in 
format according to the APA publication manual. 
2. The original and three legible copies are required; 
articles accepted for publication are read and approved 
by a minimum of three members of the Editorial Board. 
3. Each manuscript submitted should be accompanied 
by an identification cover sheet containing the following 
current information about each author: 
a. Name and official title 
b. Institutional affiliation 
c. Address, including zip code 
d. A statement whether or not the article has been 
previously published or is under consideration by 
another publication. 
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FROM THE EDITOR. • • 
We are pleased to feature another of our "special topics 
issues." Guest Editor, Kenneth Sutton, has assembled a 
group of four scholars with expertise in applied philosophy 
who present a thorough discussion - debate, both 
theoretical and practical, regarding the question of values 
imposition. Most careers in education are characterized by 
what the practitioner does relative to the question. 
When students or staff members are being evaluated, the 
person doing the evaluation may raise a private question: 
"Do I really have a right to do this?" When a teacher, 
counselor, or administrator is conducting a group discus-
sion there is often a need to decide whether to let it proceed 
freely or to limit what can happen. Assignments one gives 
Acknowledgements . .. 
can be more or less open to student, client, or staff member 
initiative. Rules a teacher, counselor, or administrator may 
establish can be more or less numerous, more or less 
definite, and more or less strictly enforced. 
In a unique format, each author provides an original 
position statement regarding values imposition in the 
schoolhouse in terms of a traditional social ideology. In the 
final section, each author, in a separate article, critiques the 
essays written by the other three authors. 
The approach is interesting, and we trust that it will be 
stimulating to theorists and practitioners. Guest Editor 
Kenneth Sutton provides additional background for the idea 
in his introductory article. 
For particulars in the following announcements regarding events at Eastern, the Editor is 
indebted to Audrey Du men tat and staff writers on the Eastern Daily News and to Harry Read and 
Charles Titus in the Offices of Information and Publications and Alumni Services . 
Charles Joley Appointed Dean, School of Education 
Dr. Charles L. Joley came to 
Eastern Illinois University in 1970 
as the University Liaison Officer to 
the Illinois Office of Education in 
the Department of Adult, Voca-
tional, and Technical Education. 
Shortly thereafter, he became the 
Coordinator of Field Services in 
the Center for Educational Studies 
to provide service to area public 
schools, and later added the post 
DR. CHARLES L. JOLEY of Director of Occupational Educa-
tion to his record. On November 1, 
1982, Dr. Joley became the new Dean for the School of 
Education. 
Dr. Joley began his educational career in 1957 as a 
vocational teacher; he later became Superintendent of 
Schools for the Cullom Elementary and High School 
Districts for 1961-1962 and the Oakland Community Unit 
District from 1962-1968. After serving as the Director for 
Administrative Services in the Eastern Illinois Development 
and Service Unit from 1968-1970, Dr. Joley came to 
Eastern, completing his doctorate in Educational Admini-
stration at the University of Illinois that same year. 
The new dean said that after 18 years of administrative 
positions, he believes that one of his greatest assets is his 
ability to manage resources, both human and financial. "I 
think I can knock down barriers to help people become as 
productive as possible." Dr. Joley added that he also has a 
knack for taking "theories or a series of ideas and applying 
them in such a way that they do more than float in the air." 
As an administrator, Dr. Joley was responsible for the 
development and implementation of degrees in Career 
Occupations at Eastern, and through his efforts, the degree 
program became the only one of its type to be approved by 
the State Teacher Certification Board. 
A member and consultant to numerous educational 
councils and organizations and an author of professional 
journal articles, Dr. Joley is also a member of several state 
and national professional associations. He has been 
honored with many awards during his career, such as the 
Outstanding Educator in Higher Education in 1974 and 1975 
and the Meritorious Service to Vocational Education Award 
for five consecutive years from 1973-1977. Dr. Joley was 
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also one of four educators selected nationally to represent 
the United States in the Polish-American Scholars 
Exchange Program in 1977. 
Dr. Joley said he has several points of focus as the new 
Dean in the School of Education. 
"I want to get across the social significance of teaching to 
communities; I would also like to see teaching regain the 
position of a valued profession, so we can continue to 
attract able, capable people into the profession." The dean 
said that the future will definitely see a teaching shortage, 
and there will be a continuing demand for graduates in 
education . 
Dr. Joley continued his points of focus by stating a need 
for a cooperative program with area public schools and a 
Daniel E. Marvin Resigns EIU Presidency 
DR. DANIELE. MARVIN 
On March 17, Daniel E. Marvin, 
Jr. sent a campus-wide com-
munication to "colleagues and 
friends." In part, the letter read: 
"Later this afternoon I will an-
nounce my resignation as Presi-
dent of Eastern Illinois University 
effective July 1, 1983. This has 
been one of the hardest decisions 
of my life, because I am extremely 
proud of this University, its many 
fine accomplishments, the quality 
of its academic programs, and 
most of all the warmth and dedication of its faculty, staff, 
and students. 
"I am proud of my own work here . . . I believe we are 
better and more efficiently managed and have a greater 
impact on our primary service regions . .. It would not have 
been possible to accomplish these tasks without your effort 
and cooperation ." 
"Because my family and I will continue to be in this area, 
we will be fortunate to keep many friends . For this we are 
thankful." 
Marvin will become President and Chief Executive Officer 
of the First National Bank of Mattoon and its parent holding 
company, First Mid-Illinois Bancshares, Inc. He has served 
on the bank's Board of Directors since 1980. 
Marvin came to Eastern in February, 1977 as the fifth 
president. He had previously served as the Director of the 
State Council of Higher Education for the state of Virginia . 
Eastern, Marvin said, "is the finest regional university in 
the state of Illinois, if not the entire midwest." He credited 
each of the four preceding presidents with establishing "a 
foundation upon which the next president could continue to 
build." 
During his six years as Eastern's president, Daniel E. 
Marvin always placed great emphasis on academics, an 
Eastern administrator said following Marvin's resignation. 
"In his language, that's what we're (Eastern) .all about," 
Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs Stanley 
Rives said . 
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need for some type of support program for first year 
graduates, as well. He mentioned that ties between the 
University and the State Board of Education should be 
strengthened and added, "I would also like to see a coming 
together of the various departments in Education in a 
cooperative activity, perhaps in some type of generic 
Education program." 
Dr. Jomy said that along with Associate Dean George 
Schlinsog and Ronald Leathers, Assistant to the Dean, 
there is a "terrific foundation" for a very capable 
administrative team. And with help from faculty members, 
the school will be able to reach a consensus of the important 
issues that must be faced by the School of Education. 
In addition, Rives cited Marvin's ability to manage 
Eastern's resources as one of the major contributions of his 
administration. 
Because Eastern has been underfunded in recent years 
compared to other universities, Marvin has had to handle 
the available funds with extreme care in order to maintain 
quality, Rives added. 
Marvin's skills in managing university funds were recently 
put to the test with the implementation of a state-required 
2-percent budget cut, as well as the formulation of 
contingency budget plans to help meet possible budget cuts 
in Fiscal Year 1984. 
Rives also said Marvin established a good working 
relationship with members of the university community, 
including "open communication lines with students, 
faculty, and staff." 
He was always willing to consider how other people might 
feel in their respective positions, Rives added. 
Other highlights of Marvin's six year administration 
include: 
• Marvin's approval of a $9 student athletic fee hike in 
January, 1981 which stipulated that women's and men's 
athletics would receive $8 per student per semester and the 
cheerleaders, pep band. marching band, and Pink Panthers 
would receive the remaining $1 per student per semester. 
• Marvin's two trips to Poland as part of a monitoring and 
evaluation committee to determine if the United States is 
ready to begin more exchange efforts between Polish and 
American educational institutions. 
• His trips to Korea, Taiwan, and China in the summer of 
1981 to establish a working relationship for future faculty 
and student exchange between Eastern and universities in 
those countries. 
• His return to the classroom to teach Zoology 2999 
"Human Physiology" during fall semester 1981. 
Marvin, 45, took the post of Eastern president in 
February, 1977 after former Eastern President, Gilbert C. 
Fite, resigned to assume the Richard 8. Russell Professor-
ship of History at the University of Georgia. 
Rives Appointed Acting President 
DR. STAN RIVES 
Dr. Stan Rives, Eastern's pro-
vost and vice president for ac-
ademic affairs,- assumed the duties 
of acting president July 1 and will 
serve until the Board of Governors 
appoints a president. Before com-
ing to Eastern, Rives was associate 
provost and dean of undergrad-
uate instruction at Illinois State 
University in Normal. He has been 
Eastern's vice president for ac-
ademic affairs since January 1981 
and provost since last January. 
Rives' experience as an administrator at both Illinois State 
and Eastern has given him experience in the daily operations 
of a university. This experience should serve him well in the 
position of acting president. 
Since his appointment to the office of vice president of 
academic affairs, Rives has been instrumental in initiating 
and administering several new programs. One of his 
primary objectives as vice president of academic affairs was 
to maintain high academic standards by establishing an 
honors program for academically talented students. 
Rives met his objective by establishing Eastern's honors 
program which is designed to be more challenging for above 
average students of freshman or sophomore standing. 
Crane, Matzner Announce Retirements, Effective August, 1983 
Another program that Rives helped establish is the 
five-year academic plan program, a continuous planning 
process involving·· all academic schools, departments, 
and/or units. 
Rives will be EIU's chief officer until mid-fall, when the 
Board of Governors picks a replacement for former 
President Daniel E. Marvin Jr. Rives, who came to EIU as 
vice-president for academic affairs in 1981, is one of the 
candidates for that job. He and his wife Sandy have two 
children, University of Illinois Asian Studies graduate 
student, Jacqueline, and Charleston High School student 
Joseph. 
Appointment of faculty and staff members to a steering 
committee for preparation of the institutional self-study 
required for re-accreditation by the North Central Associa-
tion (NCA) was Rives' first official act. 
The NCA accreditation team is scheduled to visit the 
campus in November 1984 and make a recommendation on 
re-accreditation. 
"Our most important single objective during the 1983-84 
academic year," Rives said, "is adequate preparation 
through a well-done self-study indicating that we continue 
to offer quality educational programs and services to 
students." 
As a tribute to their distinguished careers, we re-print some "warm words " by Professor Hal 
Malehorn, colleague and friend. 
Bill Crane, renowned cat fan-
cier, and for 26 years a professor at 
EIU, will be leaving the Depart-
ment of Educational Psychology 
and Guidance. Bill, notorious as 
well for his ready wit, came to 
Eastern first in 1952 with a 
doctorate in hand, compliments of 
Yale. He was Director of Student 
Activities in Old Main in those early 
years, a job that lasted for four 
years. A brief interruption took him 
DR. WILLIAM CRANE to Eastern Michigan University 
where he was Associate Dean of Men and "well on the way 
to the presidency." However, that job just didn't jell , so Bill 
returned to campus. At the persuasion of Emma Reinhart he 
signed on with his present department. 
Bill has no great and glorious plans for retirement. His 
wife, Mathie!, who will simultaneously be bidding farewell 
to Charleston High counseling, is likely to try to get Bill to do 
some traveling; but, according to Bill, she is not likely to 
succeed. He says he will be entertained by watching the 
resident joggers trot by his house. And he plans to keep in 
touch with his offspring who are "relatively" close by. 
Gerry Matzner, soon-to-be an 
"ex" School Service person, arriv-
ed at Eastern a bit more circu-
itously: grad studies at Cornell, 
three years overseas during WWII , 
teaching at Augustana (the one in 
South Dakota, that is), a super-
intendency in Minnesota, and a 
several-year tenure at Rutgers. He 
came aboard Eastern in 1955 and 
for a while taught all the school 
administration courses singlehand-
DR. GERHARD MATZNER ed on a three-year cycle. He lists as 
highlights of the experience his friendship with President 
Buzzard ("a shrewd man") and his affiliation with various 
local and national organizations through which he could see 
his students make their own mark in the school 
administration field. 
Travel is definitely of interest to Gerry; he'd just as soon 
go around the globe on a tramp steamer as any other way, 
but in the meantime he has a couple of hot irons in the fire 
which might lead to temporary teaching overseas. But what 
with two sons in the Champaign-Urbana area, he and his 
wife are not likely to wander too far for too long. 
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EIU Receives NCATE Reaccreditation 
And Weighs The Process 
by Brad Wright, Student Writer 
Directly or indirectly, the Education related faculty at the 
University, administrators of teacher education programs, 
and central administrative staff spent 18 months voluntarily 
and laboriously preparing a self-study of over 35 programs 
for review on November 8 of 1982. As the time grew near, 
tension mounted and Eastern's School of Education was 
covered with the face of anticipation . 
When the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher 
Education ( NCATE) team did arrive, the entire affair was 
carried off more than smoothly. According to Dr. Jerry 
Robbins, the chairman for the accreditation team, the 
preparation for the visit by all involved at Eastern made the 
usual tedious task much more manageable. 
Robbins said, "We were able to function efficiently 
because of Eastern's preparedness." 
So, Eastern did everything it was supposed to do 
(probably more), and the process was successful. In March 
of 1983, the University received notice of re-accreditation 
for all programs. But what does it really mean to the School 
of Education? What are the benefits of the accreditation 
process, and are they worth it? 
Ronald Leathers, Assistant to the Dean of the School of 
Education and coordinator of the NCATE self-study, said "I 
think it is very important that we have a process for policing 
ourselves (education), and NCATE does this." 
But what about the cost? Leathers added that the 
approximate cost of $7,000 for accreditation every 10 years 
and an annual membership fee of $440 is reasonable when 
compared to the benefits, and he said that one must realize 
that it takes a considerable budget to maintain such a large 
organization as NCATE. 
Leathers said that being accredited by NCATE means 
"reputation for quality." He said, "Graduate Schools and 
employers know that graduates of Eastern come from a 
school that maintains widely accepted standards." Leathers 
added that NCATE, in some cases, may also benefit a 
graduate in that it may result in a reciprocal agreement 
between states. In essence, it makes certification an easier 
process for a teacher making an interstate transfer because 
of NCATE's quality standards. 
Dr. Gene Scholes, Director of Audio Visual and chairman 
for Resources and Facilities for Basic Programs in the 
self-study, agreed that NCATE accreditation means quality 
and said that one of the best ways it addresses "Quality 
consciousness" is the self-study. In the words of Dr. Robert 
Barger, chairman for Curriculum of Basic Programs in the 
NCATE study, 'The self-study process provides an 
opportunity for us to take a look at, and reflect upon, our 
own programs, making it a point for personal quality 
control." 
However, Barger added that review by an outside source 
is also necessary for quality control. "It is a good idea to 
have peers outside of your own academic community to 
review the programming, because it is easy to live so close 
to your work that the proper perspective for scrutiny is 
lost ." 
Two important by-products of the self-study were also 
mentioned by Dr. Shirley Moore, Dean for Academic 
Development and an active participant in the self-study. 
One benefit, she said, is the general knowledge that is 
personally obtained about the University through the 
NCATE process that might not otherwise be known. Moore 
said, "I found out all kinds of things that reinforced my 
beliefs in the University." 
The second by-product that Moore mentioned was the 
additional structural cohesion brought about by the needed 
interaction of the various levels of organization within the 
University during the accreditation process. 
Although most involved were quick to point out the 
benefits that N CA TE provides to the School of Education 
and its students, comments were made concerning some 
weaknesses in the process. And there were even some 
suggestions for solutions. 
Leathers said that NCATE "certainly" helps to keep a 
steady interest by the school toward constant improvement 
in programming, but he added that having a reaccreditation 
requirement of every 10 years also "leaves no question that 
last minute improvements and quick repair work to 
programs does occur." He suggested that checkup visits 
every two or three years might lessen the dilemma. 
Realizing that the cost would be greatly increased by 
thousands of dollars under the current procedures of 
accreditation, Leathers also stated that the process would 
have to be simplified in some manner to lessen the financial 
burden. 
The setting of standards was another problem area that 
was mentioned . 
Barger said, "One problem with NCATE is that it is simply 
a means for providing standards of minimal quality. This 
tends to create only acceptable achievement when more 
could be accomplished." 
Dr. Max Gerling, student teaching coordinator for 
mathematics, said that another problem with standards is 
how they are evaluated. He said, "Trying to give the full 
picture with all the facts in a three-day visit which allows for 
only a small degree of the total programming to be viewed 
directly by a visiting team is an impossible task." Gerling 
said that this is a shortcoming of any accrediting body, 
because the cost of more detailed study during visitations is 
prohibitive. 
A problem that virtually everyone who played a part in the 
accreditation process mentioned was that those who are 
not directly involved with NCATE are really unaware of the 
time consuming effort that produces that final element of 
accreditation. 
Leathers said that if students were more aware, they 
would probably be appreciative of the benefits. "It is 
unfortunate that the ultimate beneficiary of accreditation 
(the student) is not a more fully aware participant in the 
process, but this problem is, perhaps, one of the easier 
problems of accreditation to solve," he said. Involvement 
programs for students and student participation on 
self-study committees were mentioned by several Education 
faculty member involved with NCATE. 
In all, those who were involved with NCATE, and even 
those who were only aware of the process, thought that the 
accreditation ideology was a worthy undertaking. Despite 
the time, money, effort, and a few shortcomings of the 
process, the higher quality of education produced from 
accreditation seemed to all a fair trade. Eastern is a 
university that was founded and established on education 
principles, and it will continue to build on those principles in 
the future. The National Council for Accreditation of 
Teacher Education has taken part in educational growth at 
the university; and with the helpful input of member 
universities, such as Eastern, perhaps NCATE will continue 
to strengthen its foundation, as well. 
EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP: Eighth National Conference of Scholars and Educators 
A dynamic and dedicated leadership team has for months 
been anticipating each step along the way to an outstanding 
Scholar and Educator Conference, Fall 1983. It is 
spearheaded by Bob Barger and Ron Leathers of Eastern 
Illinois University, the host institution. Enthusiastic co-
planning help has come from Bob Miller and Rose Mary 
Shepherd of the Regional Superintendent's Office. 
The Eighth National Conference of Educators and 
Scholars will take place at Eastern Illinois University, 
Thursday and Friday, October 6 and 7, 1983, with 
sponsoring cooperation from the local university, school, 
and regional community. 
The theme of the Conference is: "Education and 
Scholarship: Community Strength and Individual Needs." 
Topics of preliminary proposals include: Legalism and 
schooling . Classroom discipline. Computer software and 
education . Education to balance work and leisure. High 
tech, low touch, new values. Testing for competencies. 
Government's changing role. Community instructional 
delivery. Cross-cultural education. Senior citizens' unmet 
needs. Progress despite resource limitations. Professional 
pressure and personal stress. 
The Conference is for persons interested in education and 
scholarship in the broad sense of sharing specialized 
Regional Institute Program . .. 
knowledge, informed opinion, and responsible observation. 
Its interdisciplinary scope accommodates all schools, 
college, and university curricula and operations, as well as 
areas of concern throughout the community and the nation. 
Professional enrichment and high social purpose make for 
its unifying value. 
As in the past, the Conference is intended to be modest in 
size, low in cost, and convenient in format. In this way more 
persons from various backgrounds can have meaningful 
opportunity to focus more fully on substantive matters. In 
giving attention to individual needs and interest, the 
Conference depends on help from everyone to promote 
early registration and to submit program information 
promptly. 
Some of the articles in the journal, Scholar and Educator, 
will relate to the Conference topics. The 1983 issues will be 
available to all conferees. 
For information on registration, contact Conference 
Director, Dr. Robert N. Barger, Buzzard Education Building 
213, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois 61920, 
telephone AC 217-581-5931; or Dr. Jay W. Stein, HH K30, 
Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois 61455, tele-
phone AC 309-298-1528. 
An important part of the conference will be interaction between educator-minded persons from the public school system 
and those affiliated with academia or the community. A Friday morning "teachers institute" (or conference within a 
conference) will consist of well-informed and inspiring speakers, panelists, and other participants on vital themes that affect 
children, youth, the professions and all segments of the community. 
EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP-COMMUNITY STRENGTH AND INDIVIDUAL NEED 
REGIONAL INSTITUTE DAY 
8:00 - 8:40 a.m. 
8:40 - 9:50 a.m . 
10:00 - 10:50 a.m . 




October 7, 1983 
Held on the Campus of Eastern Illinois University 
Charleston, Illinois 
Sharing in McAfee North Gymnasium 
Bill Page 
" How To Get Kids To Sit Down, Shut Up, Follow Directions, and Want to Learn" - McAfee 
Gymnasium (South) 
Choose A Session or Visit Tarble Arts' Center 
" Professional Excellence in an Excellent Profession" 
Vice-President Glenn W illiams, Eastern Illinois University, McAfee Gymnasium (South ) 
" Education for the Future in a High Technology Society" 
Dean Don Lauda, Dean of the School of Technology, Eastern Illinois University, Phipps' Lecture Hall 
" Teacher Enthusiam" 
Peggy Herman and Karen Anderson-Sutton, University High School, Normal, Coleman Lecture Hall 
"Teacher Negligence and Prevention In and Out of the Classroom" 
Dr. Steve Permuth, Dean of College of Education, Bradley University, Buzzard Education Building 
Auditorium 
" To be Announced" 
Booth Library Lecture Room 
Bill Page 
" Kids Are Always Motivated - The Problem is They are Motivated to do Nothing" 
McAfee Gymnasium (South) 
" Administration Negligence and Prevention" 
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Imposing Values: A Critique 
James D. Stuart 
From The Guest Editor . .. 
Some issues are big enough to apply to everybody in 
education. The q1,1estion about when to properly impose our 
values upon those we teach, help, or lead is such an issue. 
There is not one professional educator who has avoided 
significant contact with the question of value imposition. 
When students or staff members are being evaluated the 
person doing the evaluation may raise the private question: 
"Do I really have a right to do this?" When a teacher, 
counselor, or administrator is conducting a group discus-
sion there is often a need to decide whether to let it proceed 
freely or to limit what can happen. Assignments that one 
gives can be more or less open to student, client, or staff 
member initiative. The rules a teacher, counselor, or 
administrator may establish can be more or less numerous, 
more or less definite, and more or less strictly enforced. 
Most careers in education are centrally characterized by 
what the individual does relative to the question of value 
imposition. The two most typical one-word characteriza-
tions of administrators are "strong" and "weak." The 
strong administrator is presumably willing to stand firm on 
value questions and other questions for the good of the 
staff. The weak one just lets things go as they will. Teachers 
also are labeled in a single word. Some are "hard," 
"tough," or "demanding." Others are "easy." The former 
type is usually more disposed to let his or her values 
dominate the classroom and what happens in relation to it 
than the latter type. Of course, there are other designations 
connected with one's reaction to the value imposition issue. 
"Authoritarian," "democratic," "dogmatic," and "open" 
are just some of these. In any case, what one does in 
relation to the question may well have more to do with the 
way others see him or her as an educator than anything 
else. 
Thus, the issue concerning the rightness of value 
imposition is pervasive and significant in education. It would 
seem that the time spent in carefully thinking through 
one's position on the issue would be time well spent. This 
edition is devoted to the assistance of readers in this 
philosophical task. 
Because it asks a question about the rightness of action, 
the value imposition issue is a problem in the area of ethics. 
Of course, the issue is being raised in relation to the 
education professions. A balance between good philosoph-
ical substance and clear, practical application will be 
necessary; this has been a constant aim through all stages 
of the preparation of this edition. 
The contributors to this work were selected not only 
because of their formal perparation and expertise in applied 
philosophy, but also because the editor has discussed and 
argued the value imposition issue with each and has noted 
enough difference between perspectives to provide some 
real alternatives for readers to consider. This should 
challenge readers to reconsider their own thinking, for some 
of the authors will be launching their best cases against 
beliefs that a reader might hold concerning value 
imposition, while others may offer new ammunition for the 
defense of a position a given reader might agree with. 
Each author was asked to begin his article with a position 
statement. This includes clarifying remarks, some positive 
defense, and a description of what assumption of the 
position would mean to a teacher, a counselor, and an 
adminstrator. 
Dr. Robert Barger's article, "Permitting Individuals to 
Create Values," opens the sharing of perspectives. His is 
probably the most open stand on imposing values available 
today-that of Existentialism. The only values deemed 
genuine by that philosophy are those created by personal 
decisions. Values imposed from outside individual per-
spective-whether by a teacher, administrator, counselor, 
or anyone else-are not authentic. Thus, Dr. Barger would 
have educators give students, staff members, or clients 
ample room to make decisions and then honor genuine 
decisions they make. 
Dr. James Stuart's "Imposing with Respect for Persons" 
is based upon the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, an 
Idealist position. He holds that reason tells us that everyone 
should treat everyone else as subjects, not just as objects to 
use. Rules and structure are necessary to serve this 
principle, but imposing should always honor the power of 
those we serve to reason, not merely as things to be 
manipulated at will. His central conclusion is that educators 
should maintain due respect for each student, staff 
member, or client. This does not mean that a structure 
should be avoided. It only need be properly humanistic. 
My own "Imposing for Freedom" follows. My view is a 
type of Idealism which differs from that of Dr. Stuart in its 
stress upon cultural and intercultural factors. I hold that a 
liberating education should impose competence in terms of 
the given cultures of students, staff members, or clients and 
go on to help more mature persons broaden their 
appreciation of different lifeways under the terms of the 
rational principle of intercultural tolerance. I oppose 
imposing a "majority" culture upon everyone, but I favor 
having everyone appreciate (and even make use of) what 
other cultures have to offer. 
Dr. F.R. McKenna is granted the "last word," in 
placement of articles, at least. His "A Realist Perspective on 
Imposing Values" designates the philosophy he maintains in 
its title. Holding that there are objective truths, and 
consequently a real means of enhancing life and avoiding 
threats of life, he holds that educators are bound to impose 
values in accordance with these truths. Dr. McKenna 
maintains that "imposition" need not be harsh or 
heavy-handed at all. Yet, in that the truth in his position 
does not depend upon anyone being aware of it, there are 
times when something needs to be done for a student's, a 
staff member's, or client's own good. 
Following the four articles, the reader will find a rather 
unusual section. Each author has read all the other articles, 
and each has been asked to briefly critique those articles, 
noting positive elements and disadvantages, raising 
questions, and introducing counter-arguments. These 
critiques are collected in a final section that will hopefully 
lend further · sophistication to the exploration of the issue 
and provide an interesting exchange for the enjoyment of 
readers. 
I am pleased that the editorial staff of Education Journal 
has permitted this edition. Its theme and structure depart 
from what is usually done. I believe such occasional 
departures can be valuable. I know those of us who 
contended with the issue and with each other's perspectives 
have sharpened our understanding of ourselves as 




PART I: PERSPECTIVES 
Permitting Individuals to Create Values 
Robert Newton Barger 
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The question, "What values should be imposed on a 
person 'for their own good'?" can be answered quite 
simply: none at all! That, at least, is what an Existentialist 
would say in response to the question . The Existentialist 
would have to answer in this manner, because from an 
Existential point of view, the question seems to involve an 
inherent contradiction : Values cannot, at the same time, be 
imposed from without and also be for the individual's own 
authentic good. The reason for this is that only the 
individual can determine what his or her good is; therefore, 
only the individual can determine what particular values 
would serve that good. 
The Existentialist does not believe that there are any 
predetermined values existing independently in things. He 
or she believes that value is something that occurs only 
when an individual creates it by deciding that something is 
good for him or her. This viewpoint may be more fully 
appreciated by situating it in the total view of Existentialism, 
as summarized by C.E. Beck: 
1. Man exists in a world of choices. Determinis,n is the 
basic fabric of the physical universe, but not of man. 
2. Man must rely on himself and upon his fellow creatures 
to adjust to an adamant universe, or perish. 
3. Values are names given to terms of praise or dissatis-
faction which man assigns to events, things, or ideas 
which aid home or hinder him in existing. 
4. Existence precedes essence. There is no Grand Plan 
into which all events must fit and to which all people 
"ought" to attune. Man is. He then evaluates himself 
and his world. He does not discover relationships. He 
creates them . 
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5. Man's physical existence is all he can know. This does 
not give him license, but rather casts upon him 
responsibility to be what his potential indicates to him. 
6. Man's relationship to others must be that of self-
realization for all, and the achievement of creature 
comfort through empathy and sympathy in living out 
the life span confronting us all. 
7. Loneliness is accepted as a fact of life. Longing is an 
attribute of man. Both can give rise to noble efforts to 
resist despair, or can lead to forlornness. Man chooses. 
8. Either: a) there is no God, or b) God created the world 
somewhat in the manner described by the eighteenth 
century deists. The latter view is that of a creating force 
which fashioned man and then left him to his own 
devices. (1963, pp. 123-124) 
The Existential approach implies that each person sees 
reality through different lenses. He or she then creates 
"maps" of that reality or "territory" which, while more or 
less accurate, are not the reality or territory itself (just as 
philosophy is not wisdom but, rather, a seeking after it; and 
history is not the past but, rather, an attempt to interpret it). 
With respect to values, there is, likewise, no "Grand Plan" 
of goodness to which one "ought" to subscribe. Because 
man is active and free, he creates the values which he then 
utilizes to improve what he defines as the meaning of his 
existence. Values, then, must be chosen by each individual 
rather than being imposed from outside of the individual. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein makes this point clear. He said that 
when we hear a command to do something, we ask 
ourselves what will happen if we don't do it . But, he said, 
"ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in 
the usual sense of the terms. So our questions about the 
consequences of an action must be unimportant" (1963, p. 
442). But he insists that there must be some meaning to the 
original question. His conclusion is that external conse-
quences are not important, but internal consequences are . 
He said, "There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward 
and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action 
itself" (p. 422). 
In other words, it is not important if people praise or 
condemn me for what I do. What is important is what 
happens to my personality as a result of my actions. Thus, I 
might run into a burning building and rescue an aged person 
or a baby, not because I want to be regarded as a hero by 
others or because I want to avoid having others think that I 
am a coward, but because I think that this is the proper 
thing for me to do; by doing it, I give positive definition to 
my personality. Likewise, I might not run into the building, 
although I feel that I should. In this case, I am being 
inauthentic. I am not acting in accord with what I have 
defined as right. Here, too, I am fashioning my personality, 
but this time I am fashioning it in a negative, destructive 
sense. I am creating (becoming) a person who acts contrary 
to what he or she believes. 
With the foregoing introduction in mind, one can now ask 
what practical implications the maintenance of this 
philosophic position would have for a teacher. The answer 
is perhaps best summed up in a list of points proposed by J. 
P. Pine: 
1. Teaching is itself a learning process. 
2. The learner (whether teacher or student) is a free and 
responsible agent. 
3. Learning is an experience which occurs inside the 
learner and is activated by the learner. 
4. Learning is the discovery of the personal meaning and 
relevance of ideas. 
5. Learning is a consequence of experiencing responsi-
bility. 
6. Learning is emotional as well as intellectual. 
7. Learning is a valuing experience. 
8. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which 
encourages people to be active. 
9. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which 
promotes and facilitates the individual's discovery of 
the personal meaning of ideas. 
10. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which 
emphasizes the uniquely personal and subjective 
nature of learning. 
11. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which en-
courages openness of self rather than concealment of 
self. 
12. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere in which 
differences are good and desirable. 
13. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere which 
consistently recognizes people's right to make 
mistakes. 
14. Learning is facilitated in an atmosphere in which 
people are encouraged to trust in themselves as well as 
in external sources. (1974, pp. 19-24) 
The majority of the above-mentioned points are well 
illustrated in the following story. A student taking a physics 
test was faced with the following question: "Show how it is 
possible to determine the height of a tall buildinQ by the use 
of a barometer." She put down this answer: "Take the 
barometer to the roof of the building. Attach a rope to it and 
lower it to the ground. Measure the amount of rope used to 
reach the ground. This length will equal the height of the 
building." The teacher, on correcting the student's test, 
determined that this was not the "right" answer. But, the 
teacher decided to let the student try again. This time that 
student was told that she must show some knowledge of 
physics in answering the question. So the student 
responded with the following answer: "Take the barometer 
to the roof of the building and drop it off the edge, timing its 
fall with a stopwatch until it hits the ground. Then, using the 
formula S = ½at2, calculate the height of the building." 
Frustrated at not having elicited the right answer, even with 
the caution that physics procedures must be used, the 
teacher then asked the student to try once more. This time 
the student said: "Take the barometer out on a sunny day. 
Measure its height and the length of its shadow. Then 
measure the length of the shadow of the building. By using 
calculations based on simple proportion, the height of the 
building can be determined." Asked if she could not 
describe a more sophisticated physics method, the student 
readily replied: "Tie the barometer to the end of a string. 
Swing it like a pendulum. Determine the value of g at the 
street level and at the top of the building. Using the 
difference between these two values, calculate the height of 
the building." The student went on to volunteer that, if she 
were not limited to answers employing physics, even more 
solutions would be available. For instance, a person could 
go to the manager of the building and say: "If you will tell 
me how tall this building is, I will give you this barometer." 
Finally, the teacher asked the student if she knew the 
answer that the teacher had expected to get. The student 
said that she did indeed know, but wanted to show her 
ability to solve the problem in a way other than that which 
was routinely expected. 
In the story narrated above, it is the student, not the 
teacher, who exemplifies the Existentialist position which 
was previously described. The teacher in the story, in order 
to assume an Existential stance, would have to abandon the 
notion that there is a right answer at which the student 
should arrive (even in such a "hard science" as physics!). 
The Existentialist teacher would encourage the creative 
attitude shown by the student in this story, instead of 
implicitly trying to discourage such an attitude by prodding 
toward an expected conformity. 
Now the question might be asked, what implications 
would the Existentialist position have for an educational 
counselor? Most people are familiar with the theory of 
non-directive, client-centered counseling espoused by Carl 
Rogers. The counselor, according to Rogers, should not 
attempt to solve the client's problems for him or her. 
Rather, the counselor should assist the client in reflecting on 
the problem so that the client solves it for himself or herself. 
This theory is none other than the Existentialist position in 
counseling. Values are never imposed by the counselor. 
Rather, they are elicited from the individual client. 
Finally, what can be said of the implications of the 
Existentialist position for an educational administrator? 
Here, again, a story may be helpful in formulating an answer 
to this question. The story is known as the "legend of the 
Grand Inquisitor." In The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky has one of the brothers, Ivan, create a legend 
which is set in sixteenth century Spain during the height of 
the Inquisition. He describes the Grand Inquisitor as walking 
the streets one day with his henchmen, when the Inquisitor 
sees a man approaching in the distance. The man is healing 
the sick and raising the dead. A crowd gathers, and 
recognizing Him by His works of compassion, the crowd 
begins to shout, "It is He, it is He!" Immediately 
understanding what is happening, the Grand Inquisitor 
orders his henchmen to arrest the man. That night the 
Grand Inquisitor visits the man in his dungeon cell. He tells 
Him, "I know who you are. You came once before, but 
you failed men. I have corrected your work. I have chosen 
to serve men better." The Grand Inquisitor continues, 
explaining, "The one thing that man cannot bear is his 
freedom. But instead of taking this awful burden away from 
him, you only made it worse. You made man's freedom 
absolute. His responsibility for decisions you made total, 
forever binding. But I have lifted this burden off his 
shoulders. I have freed man from his freedom. In this way, I 
have protected weak man from himself" (1937, pp. 
257-272). 
The Grand Inquisitor presents a model of the non-Existen-
tial administrator. He believes that people cannot be trusted 
with the freedom to make an independent decision, because 
they might make a mistake. The figure of Jesus in the 
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legend, however, presents a model of the Existential 
administrator. He frees people so that they can make 
choices and can take on themselves the responsibility for 
those choices. Etymologically, the word "administrator" 
means, "one who serves another." Thus, the term is more 
aptly applied to one who facilitates another's freedom of 
choice than to one who unilaterally directs another 
concerning what shall be done. 
By way of comparison, Existentialism stands against 
several traditional positions in philosophy. In order to 
understand how the Existential position on values compares 
with these positions, each must be examined in a systematic 
way. First, there is Idealism. This system says that reality is 
basically spiritual, that truth is known by the mind, and that 
values are immaterial, absolute, and unchanging. Thus, 
values must be imposed on the individual. Or, put another 
way, the individual must comform to fixed values, rather 
than vice versa. Realism, on the other hand, says that reality 
is basically material or physical, and truth is best known 
through the senses; thus, values are natural, that is, lying in 
the mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency. 
Again, there is a fixed set of values (this time natural, rather 
than spiritual) to which the individual must conform. 
Pragmatism, a philosophy which flows out of Realism, sees 
reality in a much different perspective than do either 
Idealism or Realism. Both of these former philosophies see 
reality as a static thing. Pragmatism, however, says that 
reality is experience or change-a very dynamic thing. 
Thus, in the matter of truth, neither the mind nor the senses 
can adequately handle the knowledge of reality. A dynamic 
knowledge instrument is needed in order to grasp such a 
dynamic reality, and this instrument is the experiment or 
test. Pragmatists say that we learn by trying things out. 
When they come to the question of values, they have no 
fixed universe (either spiritual or material) on which to base 
their values. Thus, with values, as with truth, they base their 
judgment on results. If a plausible solution solves a problem, 
it is a "good" solution. If dropping an atom bomb on Japan 
brought the Second World War to an end, it was a good 
thing to do from a Pragmatic point of view. But there is a 
problem here. What if Emperor Hirohito were asked if it was 
a good idea to drop the atom bomb on Japan? The problem, 
then, is who is going to judge whether the results are good. 
The Pragmatists have ruled out a stable standard once they 
accept only fluid views on the nature of reality and truth. 
Thus, the only fair way, in their view, to handle decision 
making is to let the majority decide. Obviously, in the case 
of the atom bomb example, a lot depends on how "the 
majority" is defined (e.g., are Japanese going to be 
included in it?). A position closely related to Pragmatism is 
Cultural Relativism. This position sees the cultural group to 
which an individual belongs as the basis for the 
identification of that individual (e.g., "I am a Seminole 
Indian."). Values for a Cultural Relativist are literally relative 
to the culture to which the individual belongs. They are not 
relative only to the individual himself or herself. 
Some people, however, would rather not entrust the 
making of decisions to any kind of majority, and this brings 
us to the last system, Existentialism. Most Existentialists 
would resist the categorization of their views as being 
systematic, but their thinking can at least be paralleled with 
the systematic views of the other philosophies. Existentialist 
thinking on questions of reality and truth is similar to the 
thinking of the Pragmatists on these questions, although 
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phrased somewhat differently. Existentialists say, concern-
ing reality, that existence is a given, but that what becomes 
of it is not a given. In other words, what a person is is not 
the basic question, but rather what he or she becomes. All 
people start out existing, but what will they make of their 
existence? On the question of truth, Existentialists believe 
that the important element of the question pertains to 
decision. If there is no set pattern of "givens" in reality, then 
truth is not fixed, but rather is a matter of individual choice. 
If I think you don't like me, then the truth of the matter, as it 
affects me, is that you don't like mel It was earlier 
mentioned that the Existential views on reality and truth 
parallel the Pragmatist views on reality and truth. Since the 
Pragmatists have relative views on reality and truth, it 
follows that the Pragmatist views on value would be relative 
also, since in a system the more basic metaphysical and 
epistemological views tend to shape the axiological views. 
The same holds true for the Existentialists. The difference is 
that, whereas the Pragmatists look to the group majority as 
the decision-making unit concerning relativist values, the 
Existentialists say that the inalienable unit of choice is the 
individual himself or herself. The main dispute between the 
Pragmatists and Existentialists, then, is whether the 
individual is basically a part of the group, or whether the 
group is basically an assembly of individuals. Often when 
questions of reality or truth are being discussed, it will not 
be possible to tell the difference between a Pragmatist and 
an Existentialist. But when questions of value come up, one 
can usually tell the difference by noticing whether an appeal 
is made to a social standard (Pragmatic) or to individual 
autonomy (Existentialistic). 
Viewpoints on values (just as viewpoints on reality and 
truth) are basically matters of faith or belief. This assertion is 
supported by the "Principle of Uncertainty" which was 
articulated by Werner Heisenberg (Gamow, 1958, pp. 
51-57). This principle points out that an observer in a 
paradigm is never outside the paradigm and, therefore, can 
never be completely objective in his or her observations. 
The observer can never fully separate himself or herself from 
his or her plan of observation. Individuals are influenced by 
the plane to which they are related and , incidentally, also 
influence the plane which they observe (this is illustrated in 
the Social Science field by the Hawthorne Effect). Thus, 
everything is more or less relative or subjective. It is in this 
sense that selecting a valid philosophy becomes a matter of 
choosing which philosophic view best explains the universe. 
Nature and meaning are not compulsive things which 
impose themselves on us. Rather, they are things which call 
for choice among various alternatives (the more alterna-
tives, the better!). Selectio_n of a world view or philosophy 
from which values ultimately arise thus involves subjectivity 
and choice. In a sense, then, any philosophy which a person 
decides to live by comes down to an Existential philosophy. 
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"When should one, as an educator, impose his or her 
values upon students, clients, or staff members?" This is 
the question upon which I have been asked to take a stand. 
The question, as I understand it, is a moral question. It asks, 
"Under what conditions would it be morally justified for an 
educator to impose his or her values upon students, clients, 
and staff members?" Thus, the question does not concern 
such matters as, "How much value imposition can I get 
away with?" Or, "Which values can be imposed on others 
without producing complications for me?" We are 
considering what is morally permissible, not what is 
prudent. 
"When is it morally permissible for an educator to impose 
his or her values upon students, clients, or staff members?" 
Although it is not clear to me that there is a single answer to 
this question which covers one's relations t<? a~I of th~se 
groups, I would like to suggest a general principle which 
provides some guidance for our actions. The principle 
derives from the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It says 
that our actions should be such as to respect others as free 
and rational beings: to treat others as ends and not merely 
as a means to our own ends (Kant, 1963, pp. 96-98). 
Therefore, the educator is not justified in imposing his or her 
values where this involves a failure to respect students, 
clients, and staff members as free and rational individuals. 
I will begin by attempting to explain what this principle 
means and then suggest how it can be employed to assist 
our thinking about the issue of values imposition. After it is 
understood how the principle works in practice, I will 
compare it to other sorts of principles which one might 
employ in dealing with the imposition of values. 
What does this principle mean? The first thing to get clear 
about it is the difference involved in treating someone as an 
end as opposed to treating someone merely as a means. For 
Kant this comes down to claiming that we ought to treat 
individuals as persons and not as objects. So, what does 
that mean? One of the essential notions connected with 
being a person is the ability to think: to choose certain goals 
and determine the means by which they can be reached . 
Kant calls this "rationality." If such rational deliberation is to 
have any point, of course, one must be free to act on one's 
choices. Indeed, to be free, according to Kant, involves just 
the ability to act from rational deliberation, instead of acting · 
merely from one's desires or inclinations. Freedom is what 
gives value or worth to humans; in short, it is what makes 
them persons rather than mere things or objects. It is also 
what makes humans capable of moral action. 
Given the nature of persons as free, rational beings, the 
principle asserts that it is wrong to ignore their nature by 
treating them as though they were mere objects. To get a 
feel for what it means to treat something as an object, 
consider the way in which we use "things." Take, for 
instance, the manner in which we treat our cars. Since our 
cars are among the most expensive of our possessions and 
represent a sizeable investment, we probably treat them 
better than most of the other things we own, say a shovel or 
a chair. We may be careful to keep our cars well maintained 
and even to wash and polish them occasionally. 
Nevertheless, we still treat a car as an object. If it is involved 
in an accident or develops serious mechanical difficulties, 
we may decide to trade it for another one, or even to junk it. 
In so doing, we do not think we have acted improperly. This 
is because the car has value only so long as it can perform 
its function . It is valued, to use Kant's language, as a 
means, and not as an end in itself. Since the car is only an 
object, even though a very expensive one, its value consists 
only in what it can do for us; when it can no longer perform 
its function, we discard it and get another. 
Now, there is nothing immoral about using the car merely 
to satisfy our needs and simply disposing of it later. It is an 
object, and to manipulate it for our purposes is to u_se it 
properly. But the case is far different with human bem~s. 
Their value is not merely extrinsic or external to some desire 
or goal we happen to have, for we are dealing with persons 
and not objects . Persons have value in and of themselves. 
That which makes them valuable, the fact that they are free 
and rational beings, provides the clue to what it is to treat 
them as persons and not things. We are obligated to "treat" 
persons so that we do not violate their rational fr~edom._ 
One way a person's rational freedom can be violated 1s by 
telling the person a lie. Imagine that I offer you a job and 
agree to pay you $300 for one week's work. Suppose at the 
end of the week I decide to pay you only $100, even though 
your work was completely satisfactory. By deceiving you 
regarding the amount you were to be paid, I have 
manipulated you and, thus, violated your rational freedom . 
If you had known you would receive only $100 for your 
labor, you might have decided to take a different job or, 
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perhaps, to wait until you received a better offer. By lying to 
you, I have denied you the opportunity to make a rational 
choice and, therefore, the opportunity to act freely, since I 
have withheld the necessary information upon which a 
rational choice could have been made. I have used you to 
satisfy my desires and purposes without regard for your 
own desires or purposes. In other words, I have treated you 
as an object and not as a person, as a means rather than an 
end. 
This is not to suggest that it is wrong to treat other 
persons as a means to some end. What is wrong is to treat a 
person merely as a means. When I offer you the job for a 
week and pay you the $300 I have promised you, I am using 
you as a means. I have work that needs to be done, and you 
are the means by which that work is accomplished. But 
provided that I do not misrepresent the nature of the job nor 
the pay you are to receive, I have not treated you only as a 
means. That is, I have not interfered with you making a 
rational choice concerning whether or not you should 
accept the job. So, there is a vast difference in the two 
cases. When I misrepresent the job or the amount you are to 
be paid, you are denied the opportunity to exercise your 
rational freedom and are being used only as a means. 
There are, of course, more direct and violent ways of 
denying one's freedom. Rape, theft, and kidnapping are 
rather obvious examples. Each of these, as well as the lying 
example, involve treating persons as if they were objects. 
The victim is being used to satisfy the desires or goals of the 
assailant while his or her desires or goals are ignored or even 
violated. At this point, the following difficulty arises: If it is 
wrong to interfere with the freedom of others in seeking 
their goals and satisfying their desires, how can we justify 
interfering with the activities of rapists or thieves? By 
interfering with their actions, are we not ignoring their 
desires or goals and treating them merely as objects rather 
than persons? 
In such cases, we must remember that the actions we are 
opposing are themselves violations of the freedom of 
others. By failing to oppose such activities through laws 
prohibiting such behavior and sanctions for their violations, 
we are failing to value the freedom of other persons. 
Ordinarily, only the appropriate legal authorities have the 
right to interfere with the actions of those attempting to 
harm others. But there are exceptions. We generally 
recognize the right of self-defense and the right, if not the 
obligation, to come to the aid of someone whose life is in 
jeopardy because of the hostile acts of another. Intervention 
is justified in such instances since we are acting to prevent 
an intrusion on another person's freedom (Kant, 1965, pp. 
230ft). Thus, the principle that we should respect the 
freedom of other persons justifies limiting the freedom of an 
individual in order to prevent him or her from violating the 
freedom of another. This is not inconsistent with the general 
principle that it is wrong to interfere with the freedom of 
another. In fact, limiting the freedom of those who violate 
the freedom of others is justified on the grounds that 
violating the freedom of another person is wrong (Gregor, 
1964, pp. 44-45). 
The moral principle I am recommending, then, says we 
should always treat others as ends or persons and not 
merely as a means or an object. As we have seen, this 
comes down to saying we ought not interfere with the 
freedom of other persons unless they are, themselves, 
interfering with another person's freedom. Thus, aggressive 
behavior toward others is ruled out. But a more subtle 
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implication of treating others as persons is that it rules out 
claiming for myself a liberty in action which is not 
compatible with a like liberty for all. Take, for example, not 
paying one's taxes. Kant would claim that this sort of act is 
incompatible with allowing a like liberty for all. For, if no one 
paid taxes, all of our public institutions would collapse with 
devastating results for the well being of society. So, one 
who does not pay his or her taxes is not willing to extend to 
others the same freedom. In failing to pay one's taxes, one 
becomes a sort of parasite, and that involves treating others 
as a means and not as an end or person (Murphy, 1970, pp. 
104-105). 
Now that we have a basic understanding of the moral 
principle, I will make a recommendation for dealing with 
questions of value imposition. I want to point out some of 
the advantages of employing a principle of this sort, instead 
of relying upon a list of moral rules for guidance. Rules tend, 
largely, to reflect the current popular moral standards and 
conventions of a particular society at a particular time. 
Thus, as society changes, the rules must change in order to 
keep pace. This may suggest that morality is purely relative, 
and that nothing is "right" or " wrong" apart from the 
changing moral standards of society. Secondly, moral rules 
tend to be laid down in an absolute fashion by 
indoctrination. (I am assuming, for the moment, that 
indoctrination is wrong.) This inevitably raises questions of 
whether there are any valid exceptions to these rules and 
what the justification for such exceptions might be. Finally, 
there is a perennial problem of conflicting rules. What are 
we to do when two or more rules, all of which appear 
applicable to a given situation, instruct us to do 
incompatible actions? 
In contrast, the principle I am recommending does not 
involve attempting to impose, or make obligatory, 
contemporary moral standards. Instead, it provides a 
criterion for determining morally correct behavior and for 
judging the correctness of those moral standards that 
currently exist. The criterion is that it is always wrong to 
treat persons as though they are mere objects, as a mere 
means to some end and not as an end in themselves. We 
have already seen what this principle means. It implies that 
there is a moral constant, despite the fact that the mores of 
society are constantly changing. Obviously, since there is 
only one moral principle involved, there can be no conflict 
among principles as there may be among a set of moral 
rules. 
What about the tendency toward indoctrination? The 
nature of the principle being proposed does not lend itself to 
promoting the goals often associated with indoctrination. 
Any view, of course, can be presented in such a way that it 
amounts to indoctrination, but it is much more difficult to 
imagine this occurring with our proposed principle than with 
a set of moral rules. 
The significance and, I hope, the suitability of our 
principle, that we should always treat others as ends and 
not merely as a means to some other end, will emerge in its 
application to practical cases involving value imposition. Let 
us begin by taking a case from the classroom: 
A young high school teacher has a discipline problem 
in his social studies class. Three students who usually 
sit in the back of the classroom are often disruptive in 
their behavior. They often talk to each other instead of 
participating in the class discussion and, as a result, 
interfere with those students who are attempting to 
discuss issues pertaining to the assigned topics. 
Although the teacher has made some attempts to 
restore order, these have proved unsuccessful. It 
always seems that just as the discussion is warming up 
and progress is being made, the class is disrupted by 
loud talking and laughter. The teacher worries about 
taking more drastic steps to correct the situation; he is 
concerned about imposing his values (the importance 
of order and understanding the issues involved in class 
discussion) on others. After all, he reasons, those 
being disruptive are not physically harming anyone, 
and the other students appear at times to enjoy the 
interruptions. He tells himself that perhaps he should 
be more tolerant of their behavior, even though he 
personally feels that what they are doing is wrong. 
As most teachers will recognize, this is often a very 
difficult situation. There are other factors to be considered 
in addition to the possibility that in disciplining the students 
the teacher is unjustifiably imposing his values on others. A 
teacher's confidence in his or her ability is often at stake in 
severe discipline situations, since some control over what 
takes place in the classroom is a necessary condition for the 
teacher's effectiveness. Because the teacher is under 
pressure, there may be a strong temptation to act without 
thinkinQ. One of the advantages of having a guiding 
principle in such cases is that it lessens the likelihood that 
one will act without thinking. 
What action does our principle prescribe in this situation? 
This is clearly a case in which interference with someone's 
freedom is justified on the grounds of protecting the 
freedom of others. The disruptive behavior on the part of a 
few students in the class violates the freedom of those who 
wish to learn. Thus, the principle upholds the teacher's right 
to interfere with those who are disrupting the class. The 
interference is justified in terms of protecting the freedom of 
those who are not themselves interfering with the freedom 
of others. 
There are all sorts of other ways in which values are 
imposed on students whenever one teaches. In the typical 
classroom situation, students expect their work will be 
evaluated. When a teacher evaluates a student's perfor-
mance, some standard of what counts as outstanding, 
acceptable, or unacceptable work is going to be employed, 
even if the teacher is only vaguely aware of the nature of the 
standard. But employing values is not necessarily to impose 
them. Is the teacher imposing his or her values on the 
students? I think the answer is obviously, yes. The teacher 
employs his or her standards of evaluation without the 
student's consent to that particular standard of evaluation. 
Even if the students are informed of what the standards are, 
they are seldom discussed or justified. Similar points could 
be made about many other aspects of the student-teacher 
relationship in which value imposition is clear. Even 
encouraging your students to study is an imposition of 
values upon the students; they are being told, implicitly at 
least, that knowledge is good and, therefore, worth working 
for. Moreover, the student is not usually given the 
opportunity to discuss this value or to be made aware of 
opposing views (Bereiter, 1978, pp. 20-25). 
Assuming that these are cases of value imposition, the 
question is whether they are morally justified. Does such an 
imposition of values violate our principle that persons are to 
be treated as ends and not merely as a means to some end? 
As we have seen, this means we are not justified in treating 
persons so as to violate their rational freedom. In the case of 
evaluating a student's work, although this involves value 
imposition, the student's rational freedom is not denied-
provided that two conditions are met: ( 1) The student is not 
led to believe that a certain standard is going to be 
employed when, in fact, the teacher employs a different 
standard. (2) The standard itself is not unreasonable or 
arbitrary. Although the student has no voice in what the 
standard will be and may be powerless to change it, this sort 
of value imposition is usually implicit in the teacher-student 
relationship. As long as the standards are reasonable, one's 
rational freedom is not being denied. Much the same can be 
said of the teacher's upholding of knowledge as worth 
pursuing, even though no effort is made to present 
opposing viewpoints. 
The test of value imposition in the student-teacher 
relationship, then, is: Does this violate the rational freedom 
of another person? Does it involve treating others as objects 
and not as persons? Although some forms of value 
imposition do not amount to denying the rational freedom 
of another, it would seem that moral indoctrination does. As 
we have seen, some forms of value imposition, such as 
evaluating a student's work and maintaining classroom 
order, are often implicit in the student-teacher relationship, 
but indoctrination in moral values is surely not. When one 
attempts to impose moral beliefs on one's students, one is 
attempting to deny them the exercise of their rational 
freedom. Since indoctrination deprives students of the 
opportunity to discuss the merits of the beliefs being 
promoted and are not presented with what may be said 
against them, they are denied the opportunity to decide for 
themselves whether the beliefs ought to be accepted. 
Now, this claim might be objected to by pointing out that 
the students are free to accept or reject the moral views 
being offered by the teacher. Theoretically, this is true. 
Practically, however, the objection turns out to be rather 
naive, since for many students there may be little moral 
knowledge against which to judge the views being 
promoted. Also, the influence of the teacher as an authority 
figure must be taken into account. In light of these 
considerations, the students may be little more than an 
object being manipulated by the teacher. 
Another sort of value imposition, which directly concerns 
administrators more than teachers, arises in connection 
with rules and regulations governing the behavior of 
students. One such example is a student dress code. (What 
we say about dress codes can be applied to other types of 
rules and regulations.) Obviously, any sort of dress code 
limits the freedom of students with respect to what they 
wear and, perhaps, to matters of personal grooming, such 
as length of hair. It is an instance of value imposition since 
students are being told how they ought not to dress. 
Referring to the principle we are employing for deciding the 
moral acceptability of value imposition, are such restrictions 
of a person's freedom morally justified? 
Consider a dress code which restricts, among other 
things, the length of hair and forbids wearing shorts to 
classes. Given the emphasis placed upon valuing human 
freedom by our principle, we should expect that such 
restrictions on freedom, if they are going to be justified, 
must be justified in terms of protecting the freedom of 
others. (This, as we saw, was the case with the discipline 
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example discussed earlier.) In this instance, it is difficult to 
see how a dress code could be justified on those grounds. It 
appears to restrict the freedom of students without any 
apparent benefits of promoting or protecting their freedom. 
Thus, imposing this dress code on students seems to be a 
case of unjustified value imposition. Does this imply that no 
dress code could be justified? Not necessarily. If we can 
imagine students dressing in such a way (or perhaps failing 
to dress sufficiently) that it disrupted school activities, a 
dress code restricting such dress would be justified. In this 
case, the restrictions on student freedom serve to preserve 
the freedom of other students to pursue their studies and 
engage in other school activities. 
A final example of value imposition is taken from the 
counseling experience: 
Mary, a 14-year-old student, waited outside of Ms. 
Watson's office. She felt alone and afraid. 
"Please come in Mary." She walked in slowly and 
sat down. When she was finally able to speak, she 
described her situation to Ms. Watson. Mary was 
pregnant and terribly afraid her parents would find 
out. She wanted advice about whether she should 
have an abortion. 
Ms. Watson was personally a strong anti-abortion-
ist. She believed that the fetus is a human person and 
that destroying it is equivalent to murder. As she 
listened to Mary tell her story she decided she must 
convince her not to have an abortion. She felt sorry for 
Mary and the problems not having an abortion would 
cause, but her mind was made up. 
This is a clear case of value imposition, but is the 
imposition justified? The answer, I think, is no. Ms. 
Watson's treatment of Mary is an example of attempting to 
violate her rational freedom. In coming to Ms. Watson, it 
was reasonable for Mary to assume that she would advise 
her with Mary's best interests in mind and not receive an 
account of Ms. Watsons moral beliefs. Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that Mary's best interests were not an important 
factor in Ms. Watson's decision, if they were considered at 
all. Instead, she attempted to convince Mary of her moral 
beliefs. (Whether a counselor is justified in attempting to 
convince a counselee of his or her moral beliefs is a 
debatable matter among counselors, although there 
appears to be nothing morally wrong in such an attempt 
itself [Gladstein, 1976, pp. 334-338].) So, Mary's rational 
freedom was not violated simply because Ms. Watson 
attempted to convince her that she should not have an 
abortion. 
Mary's freedom was violated, because Ms. Watson failed 
to help Mary understand the various options open to her 
and what the likely consequences of following those options 
were. Moreover, she failed to do this in a context in which it 
could be reasonably expected that such assistance would be 
provided. By simply telling her she should not have an 
abortion, she reduced Mary's opportunity to exercise her 
own rational freedom and arrive at her own decision. After 
informing her of her options and their likely consequences, 
it would have been morally permissible for Ms. Watson to · 
inform Mary of her own values and the reasons for them. 
But imposing her values on Mary through indoctrination, 
violated Mary's rational freedom; she was treated more like 
an object than a person. 
Enough ha~ been done now to convey the general 
significance of adopting the principle I am suggesting for 
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guidance in values imposition decisions. Such significance 
can be better appreciated by comparing this principle to two 
other competing views, Ethical Relativism and Utilitarian-
ism. 
Ethical Relativisim is a much misunderstood view. Those 
who profess to be Ethical Relativists often have only the 
vaguest notion of what the view involves, except, perhaps, 
an opposition to any sort of moral absolutism. As I 
understana the position, the Ethical Relativist is asserting: 
"What society believes to be morally right is morally right in 
the society." Thus, morality is relative in the following way. 
If a society, call it X, believes that an activity such as 
abortion is morally wrong, then abortion is morally wrong in 
X. However, if another society, call it Y, believes that 
abortion is morally right, then it is morally right in Y. The 
moral beliefs of a society, then, determine what is morally 
right and wrong. That is, abortion is morally right in X but is 
morally wrong in Y. Hence, we can say that the moral 
rightness or wrongness of a practice, abortion for example, 
is relative to the moral beliefs of a given society (Taylor, 
1975, pp. 13-30). 
Now, what would be the implication of replacing the 
moral principle we employed earlier in resolving issues of 
values imposition with Ethical Relativism? The results, I am 
afraid, are neither terribly helpful nor interesting. Since what 
is morally permissible, for the Ethical Relativist, turns .out to 
be identical with that which society believes to be morally 
permissible, we only need to inquire about the present moral 
beliefs of society in order to tell what is morally right or 
wrong. Thus, in the classroom discipline case, since society 
in general disapproves of disorder, it seems clear that the 
teacher is morally justified in preventing disruption. 
In the abortion case (notice that a controversial issue is 
involved here), is Ms. Watson justified in attempting to 
convince Mary not to have an abortion? Two distinct issues 
are involved and must be considered in our answer. The first 
concerns the beliefs of society about the morality of 
abortion; it is difficult to say whether overall society 
approves or disapproves of abortion. Secondly, I doubt that 
society has any clear-cut beliefs regarding the moral 
permissibility of a counselor attempting to convince a 
counselee of his or her moral beliefs. If these two points are 
correct, then the Ethical Relativist is going to be unable to 
decide whether Ms. Watson was morally justified in 
attempting to convince Mary not to have an abortion. 
Moreover, I do not think the Ethical Relativist's inability to 
be helpful here is an isolated instance. Since, for the 
Relativist, the rightness or wrongness of an act is 
determined by the moral beliefs of society with respect to 
that act, it follows that on many extremely controversial 
issues Ethical Relativism is going to be unhelpful. For if we 
cannot decide whether society believes that a certain act is 
morally right or wrong, then, by employing Ethical 
Relativism, we cannot know whether it is morally right or 
wrong. 
One implication greatly associated with Ethical Relativism 
is tolerance. Since what is morally right or wrong is merely 
relative, the argument runs that we should be tolerant of the 
moral opinions of those who disagree with us. The 
suggestion seems to be that if what is morally right or wrong 
is only relative, then it is not important enough to be 
intolerant about. But if Ethical Relativism supports tolerance 
at all, it supports only the notion that we should be tolerant 
of the moral beliefs of those from other societies; it does 
nothing to support the view that we should be tolerant of 
the beliefs of those who disagree with us in our society. 
Within our own society, what society believes to be morally 
right or wrong determines what is morally right or wrong; 
thus, one moral belief is not as correct as another. It follows 
that if your moral beliefs differ from the prevailing moral 
beliefs of society, you are simply mistaken, and your moral 
beliefs are false. There appears to be little in this to 
encourage the notion of tolerance. In addition to this, there 
is nothing in Ethical Relativism to prevent one of the moral 
beliefs of my society to be intolerant of everyone who 
disagrees with us with respect to morality. In that case, it 
would be morally wrong for us to be tolerant of moral 
opinions contrary to our own, regardless of whether those 
opinions are held by those within our society or by those 
from other societies. 
In any case, tolerance is not very helpful in dealing with 
cases of value imposition. The principle of tolerance might 
be thought to suggest that values should never be imposed. 
But as we have seen, some values imposition is inevitable; 
the important question is when is it morally permissible and 
when is it not morally permissible? To be told that we should 
be tolerant is of little help. Although being tolerant might 
rule out the indoctrination of Mary by Ms. Watson, it is of 
no help in dealing with cases which involve restricting the 
freedom of some persons in order to protect the freedom of 
others. Are we simply to tolerate those who are disrupting 
the class? But that ignores the values, not to mention the 
welfare, of those who want to learn. It seems clear that 
tolerance is not the sort of moral principle required to deal 
effectively with the issue of value imposition. 
The other view we want to look at is a version of 
Utilitarianism. It asserts that the rightness or wrongness of 
an act is determined by whether it promotes the greatest 
balance of happiness over unhappiness for all of those 
affected by the act. An act that produces the most 
happiness and the least unhappiness for all of those affected 
is right; one that fails to do so is wrong. Therefore, an act, 
such as telling a lie, would sometimes be right and 
sometimes wrong, depending upon its actual conse-
quences. If my lying results in more happiness than telling· 
the truth, then lying to you was morally right. The rightness 
or wrongness of the act is determined, then, solely by its 
consequences; did the act of lying promote the greatest 
balance of happiness over unhappiness for all affected by 
the act (FranKena, 1973, pp. 34-60). 
Despite the popularity and initial plausibility of this 
principle (right acts are those that help people, wrong acts 
are those that harm people), it is, I think, defective. This can 
be most clearly seen in the classsroom discipline example. It 
can be argued that the act which promotes the greatest 
happiness and the least unhappiness for all affected, is to 
allow the occasional interrruptions to the class. The class, 
as we saw, enjoys the interruptions; and if we suppose that 
only a few students really want to learn the material, 
perhaps that act that would promote the greatest balance of 
happiness is to allow the occasional outbursts rather than to 
take the harsh measures necessary to control them. Thus, 
on the Utilitarian theory, allowing the violation of the 
freedom of a few is justified if it promotes the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. 
This, in general, is the fatal flaw in the version of 
Utilitarianism we are considering. It allows well-being and 
even rights to be violated if it results in the greatest balance 
of happiness for all concerned. Indoctrination, to take 
another example of value imposition, can be opposed by the 
Utilitarian only if it can be shown that it creates a balance of 
unhappiness over happiness. But suppose it could be 
shown that indoctrination results in a balance of happiness 
over unhappiness. In that event, the Utilitarian is committed 
to supporting it, despite the fact that the rational freedom of 
some people will be denied. I think this is enough to suggest 
that Utilitarianism is not a very promising moral principle for 
dealing with value imposition. 
I have tried to show that the Kantian principle which says 
that we "always ought to treat persons as ends and never 
merely as a means" is a useful moral principle in 
distinguishing justified cases of value imposition questions, 
Ethical Relativism and Utilitarianism. While I do not want to 
claim that the Kantian principle is the only and final answer 
to value imposition questions, it does appear to be very 
useful and to be free of the defects discussed in connection 
with Relativism and Utilitarianism. Nor do I wish to claim 
that it is without its own difficulties. These, however, will be 
best discussed in light of any appropriate objections raised 
by my able colleagues in this venture. 
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The view that some values should be imposed for 
freedom's sake might seem to be a contradiction. This is 
because so many people wrongly believe freedom and 
structure are opposites. In fact, freedom requires a 
structure. Keeping "hands off" those we serve may often 
leave whatever limitations they have intact. Limited people 
are hardly free! 
I hold that a liberating educator would be one who 
imposes the values of cultural competence and intercultural 
tolerance. Those who perform adequately in terms of their 
own lifeways are freed from the frustration of unnecessary 
failures in everyday living. Those who can tolerate other 
lifeways are relieved of biases that prevent them from 
appreciating as broadly as they might and from making use 
of viable alternatives. 
Each of these values is to be imposed at the proper time. 
Cultural competence is the appropriate theme of early 
education. Once a person is reasonably secure in his or her 
cultural setting, the attempt to broaden that person's 
perspective can properly begin. 
During the earliest part of their lives, people are not yet 
inducted into a way of life. Nevertheless, a way of life 
demands that they live according to its terms. 
Enculturation begins at birth. Adults are necessary to 
maintain infants; and their maintenance is according to 
distinctive lifeways. In the United States, for instance, one 
characteristically enters a clean world. Everything and 
everyone is carefully scrubbed. The baby is even kept 
behind glass for most of the time. Someone born within a 
group of persons not yet emerged from the stone age can 
have a very different experience. Iii any case, powerful 
influences tug one toward a specific way of life from the 
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beginning, and these influences continue as initial 
dependence is gradually left behind (Gollnick and Chinn, 
1983, pp. 8-10). 
The power and pervasiveness Qf the cultural environment 
is much better appreciated today than in times prior to 
serious ethnological study. The fact that culture is an 
inseparable part of a person's identity has become 
increasingly clear. "Individuality" itself has come to be less 
atomistic: 
Primarily, we view the individual, not as a bundle of 
psychic forces, but as a unit of society and a bearer of 
culture. We view him [her] as at once the creator 
and-to a degree-the creature of culture (Goodman, 
1967, p. 13). 
Those old enough for school have already been drawn into 
a given culture enough to see themselves in terms of it on a 
significant level. This is why minority students often resist 
some "cultural transmitter" who attempts to pull everyone 
into the majority culture (Shinn, 1972, pp. 319-321). The 
attempt is easily unmasked as " cultural chauvinism." Not 
only is such an educator declaring an impractical "war" on 
some students, he or she is denigrating lifeways as less than 
important for schools (Garcia, 1982, p. 77). 
The alternative to cultural chauvinism does not have to be 
some form of permissiveness that is too misguided to even 
correct clear incompetence. Those of us who are educators 
can insist upon students becoming competent in the terms 
of their own cultures. 
There is a lot of challenge in this. Young students have 
passed from a "stage A," where they just react to cultural 
demands, to a "stage B," where they have become 
sensitive to the shortcomings of being a baby (Titiev, 1963, 
pp. 481-490). Of course, we all know that seeing the need to 
grow up is one thing; but actually, growing up is quite 
another. The discripline of an educator can be important. 
When someone is competent enough to enter the world 
of work, the military service, or leave home for further 
study, significant encounters with different cultural groups 
can occur. Previously, a certain sheltering was proper for 
the purpose of permitting an identity to be established. The 
fact that someone else isn't as concerned about punctuality 
as oneself may seem odd or amusing until one is in a 
situation demanding that different sense of time. In the 
adult world, someone in charge may demand a different 
sense of time, and this may be for an extended period. 
Such encounters are painful at first, but they are 
necessary occasions for properly neutralizing biases. Such a 
neutral disposition toward those who are different is not 
basically different from the "scientific predisposition" 
necessary for anthropological research (Benedict, 1934, p. 
3). 
Educators can participate in neutralization of biases by 
drawing students into a greater variety of perspectives. This 
is the path to tolerance but the first part of the way is very 
confusing. A student may ask, " How can I like both ways of 
seeing and doing things? And that student will like both! In 
time, and often with the sympathetic counsel of an 
educator, the student can come to understand that what 
appears to be a snarl of contrary ideas and procedures is 
only broadened appreciation. The tensions are explained 
and relieved in a great principle of intercultural tolerance 
(Sutton, 1970, pp. 31-39). 
When the value of intercultural tolerance is realized as a 
principle it breaks down moral and practical limits. I think of 
it as a contemporary version of what Immanuel Kant called a 
"supreme practical principle" or "categorical imperative" 
(Kant, 1960, pp. 476-4n). As Kant believed of his more 
subjective stress upon treating all persons as subjects, I 
believe the value of intercultural tolerance can serve as a 
"general practical law." At the same time, this principle fits 
the less atomistic idea of individuality of modern times 
better than Kant's formulation. One could certainly will to 
have everyone realize intercultural tolerance with the 
rational confidence that the world would be vastly improved 
in its moral and social aspects. 
Any real education should culminate with liberation from 
the limits of particular cultural perspectives. It is what we 
can mean in our time by a "broadening experience." 
Adoption of my view would mean different things to 
people who work with persons on different levels of 
development. Due to this, I will break down its application 
by level of education, as well as educational role. 
Elementary educators would mostly stress growth of 
competence within various cultural terms of students. 
Ordinarily, the elementary educator is centrally concerned 
with basics, those attainments necessary to sustain persons 
in everyday life. As was previously evident, I believe those 
attainments should be properly defined by the given 
cultures of students. 
Elementary teachers should be primarily involved in 
interpreting student needs relative to their respective 
cultures and giving intelligent guidance toward meeting 
those needs. This resembles the emphasis upon interpreta-
tion and guidance so central to the educational thought of 
John Dewey (1963). 
However, I am more inclined than Dewey to consult 
parents and community members, as well as students, in 
interpreting needs. Needs as felt by students can be too 
individual to be profitably pursued in school. This will be 
very apparent whenever one champions a given child's 
interest in opposition to his or her cultural community. 
While some think this would be a favor to a child, we must 
remember that the home and community are places where 
the child must learn to live; they are the real arenas of 
success or failure. Certain frustration is no favor! 
I would have content and specific learning processes 
differ as cultural groups differ from each other. This is 
certainly more tailored to student needs than uniform 
materials and singular activities for everyone. However, it is 
not to be more permissive than traditional education in the 
excellence demanded. No one should be permitted to 
rem~in a helpless baby in terms of his or her cultural group. 
I maintain that those who counsel elementary level clients 
should go beyond the limits of a client-centered approach. 
When a person substantially differs from principles, values, 
and practices of his or her cultural group, that person is to 
be regarded as socially deviant, as he or she properly is. As 
in teaching, the feeding of a desire opposed to the lifeway of 
that group to which the client belongs is not the act of 
freedom it may appear to be. Someone who can't function 
successfully in his or her own social environment is merely 
adrift, not free. 
Even if an elementary counselor moves up from a kind of 
psychological atomism to the level of persons-in-cultures, 
there is still a need to give directions. Younger people are 
not yet mature in the ways of the respective groups that 
contribute to their identities. The counselor must advise, 
when needed, for the sake of progress relevant to a given 
client. The extent of structuring on the counselor's part will 
vary according to cultures of given clients. The degree of 
personal initiative or activity proper to a person differs 
considerably from culture to culture. 
The elementary administrator should mainly function as a 
person who maintains and enhances the overall structure 
that processes cultural competence. He or she would try to 
hire staff members capable of appreciating the different 
lifeways represented in the school(s). He or she would 
impose such rules for functioning and conduct interim 
evaluations under such standards as would encourage 
skillful teaching within proper cultural contexts and would 
cause any cultural chauvinists in the school(s) to be ill at 
ease in their positions. Money for materials and staff 
development would be parceled in such fashion as to have 
materials sufficiently broad in cultural representations and 
to have staff members broadened in perspective. The 
administrator would also strive to be an excellent example to 
staff members in dealings with students, being able to relate 
to different groups appropriately and strong enough to insist 
upon excellence of attainment for each group. 
Those who educate adolescents have the everlasting 
problem of determining whether or not they are really grown 
up. My views are no more immune to this puzzle than any 
others. Much of secondary level education would resemble 
elementary education in working on development of a 
reasonable degree of competence in particular cultural 
terms; but some older adolescents would require a 
broadening kind of education, due to significant inter• 
cultural encounters. (Some, for instance, enter the world of 
work during adolescence.) 
When such encounters become evident, secondary 
teachers can intensify student involvement in the world of 
alternative perspectives. "Right answer" instruction should 
give way to instruction that questions. Science, for 
instance, might be opened up to the contending 
philosophies underlying its altenative meanings. Students 
should also be made aware of the sincere existence of 
religious alternatives around the world. The multicultural 
factor should be an essential element in various social 
studies. In sum, differences should not be ignored at a time 
when those taught are beginning to feel a need to come to 
terms with the fact of difference. 
Of course, the upper level secondary teacher must 
remember that the new stage is only beginning for many. 
The broadening experience occasioned should be appro-
priately gradual and gentle. 
As is the case when elementary and secondary teaching 
roles are compared in relation to my view, much of the work 
of secondary administrators is like that of elementary 
administrators. Students are typically still developing a 
reasonable degree of competence in terms of their own 
cultures as the main task of their development at this point. 
Yet, to the extent that significant intercultural encounters 
are beginning, there will be some difference. Secondary 
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administrators should be more overt than those on 
elementary levels when intergroup clashes need to be 
resolved. Students should form a clear concept that others 
have a right to be different. While tolerance is to be 
practiced by staff on every level of education, students on 
the secondary level should be shown the need to adopt 
tolerance as a clear value of their own. Also, due to the fact 
that some staff members are beginning to be involved in 
broadening student perspectives, secondary administrators 
should be prepared to support them against possible 
community opposition. Although there is no general attack 
upon anything central to any culture going on in secondary 
schools as I would have them conduct their business, there 
is some departure from cultural narrowness that may be 
threatening. 
Secondary counselors will need to deal with intergroup 
matters somewhat more than those who work with younger 
persons. Some of their clients have already entered the 
world of work, and everyone will very possibly have 
occasion for significant cultural encounter in the near 
future . Some will become more fully employed, others will 
enter military service, and still others will study in higher 
education institutions . These environments frequently 
require people with differing ways of life to function 
together, and sometimes they require some to function 
according to a set of rules other than their own. (One's 
boss, drill sergeant, or instructor may have a life style 
different from one's own!) If the secondary counselor is to 
help clients avoid unnecessary frustration in an immediately 
approaching time in their lives, he or she should begin to 
lead them toward being able to cope with difference. This is 
an important part of vocational counseling, for most jobs 
require successful interaction with a variety of people. It is 
also an underlying problem in personal counseling on this 
level. Those who plan to leave home will encounter 
differences without the degree of protection against their 
effects they formerly enjoyed. 
Educators of adults differ from those who work with 
children and adolescents in that they are mainly concerned 
about broadening appreciation and participation. Whenever 
a pupil is too smugly anchored in a perspective, the 
instructor should be poised to make alternative perspectives 
as attractive as they can legitimately be. Criticism can also 
be a powerful tool to reduce dogmatism . Fair treatment of 
alternatives is crucial. It can lead students to see that those 
who differ from them can hardly be considered fools. 
The initial effect of such instruction, combined with 
significant intercultural encounters of the college environ-
ment, will be student confusion. Some may feel guilt, 
believing they have betrayed their own lifeways in learning 
to tolerate and even like aspects of other cultures. 
Counselors, instructors, and others who deal with such 
students should lead them to see the positive aspects of 
what is happening to them. They may ask (at the same time 
complimenting a given student), "Is it so terrible to like 
more kinds of things and more kinds of people than you 
used to?" This is an appeal to reason that can be extended 
to lead the student to conclude that it is neither a 
contradiction nor is it morally weak to positively entertain 
differing sets of values if one maintains an enveloping 
principle of intercultural tolerance. 
Administrators in higher education ought to work toward 
assuring a plurality of ideas and practices. Students should 
not be permitted the damaging "security" of a narrow 
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education. No one, whether in liberal arts, a professional 
school, or on an undergraduate or graduate level, should 
pursue a narrow course of study in a single field. A variety of 
perspectives should be encouraged by hiring practices and 
in permitting a voice to each of those perspectives. Narrow, 
"one-way-to-do-it" instruction should be discouraged, 
wherever it appears. Funding should leave room for a great 
variety of learning materials, and expansion of faculty 
perspectives in in-service programs. 
Among the alternatives to the view I have advocated and 
applied are several kinds of relativistic views. The closest of 
those to my view is "Cultural Relativism." The beginning 
premise of that perspective is: "Judgments are based on 
experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual 
in terms of his [her] enculturation" (Herskovits, 1956, p. 63). 
The practice of tolerance supposedly follows from this state 
of existence, because it provides no one a legitimate ob-
jective status from which culturally different persons may be 
judged. "The very core of Cultural Relativism is the social 
discipline that comes from respect for differences." (p. 77). 
However, Cultural Relativism must stop short of really 
developing an overt principle of tolerances such as my own. 
This is because the relativist initially contended everyone is 
limited to his or her cultural perspective. This puts the 
relativist in logical difficulty. Herskovits, and other 
exponents of the view, fail to explain just how anyone can 
shed ethnocentrism to the point of respecting others if 
everyone is always limited to cultural perspective (Sidney, 
1954, p. 424). The tolerance at the end is certainly desirable, 
even if kept a bit silent to mask a logical mess. One can 
seriously question whether it could arise at all from the 
prison of culture the cultural relativist initially posits. 
Cultural Relativism also has practical and ethical 
difficulties. Since it lacks an absolute principle of tolerance, 
it really can't permit a person to deal on an intercultural level 
enough to impose regulations for intercultural interactions. 
Thus, if a given student were violent toward others in a class 
due to his or her culture, an educator might well be in no 
position to legitimately police the situation (Garcia, 1982, p. 
9). Also, the cultural relativist would have little in his or her 
position that could permit opposition to a culture-against-
other-cultures, such as that of National Socialist Germany. 
Relativism is extended even further by Existentialism. In 
this perspective a given culture is even relinquished as a 
proper basis for values. The individual alone creates values 
by the serious choices that are made (Morris, 1966, p. 40). 
If any individual can be right in terms of any choice he or 
she really means to make, the possibility of anarchy in the 
schools is even more hair-raising than it might be under 
Cultural Relativism. There, at least the rules of given 
cultures are binding upon their members. When rules are 
real on an individual basis only, everybody doing everything 
can be right! 
Of course, such anarchy is impossible, even in the strange 
event someone might desire to permit it by imposing 
nothing at all upon students. When that person refuses to 
tell students (or others) what to do, he or she forces them to 
make decisions if anything at all is going to happen. 
Individual freedom is imposed. No one can educate and 
make no "waves" at all! 
There is also a "mistaken" kind of Relativism. While he 
lashed out at Idealists, Realists, and other traditional 
philosophers for their dogmatism and held truth to be 
relative to time and place, John Dewey (1957, pp. 114-117) 
proposed a view of knowledge that was to structure the 
changing content. This structure was essentially the steps 
of the method of problem solving in experimental science. It 
was to be applicable in all situations (1933). While Dewey's 
content is relative, his method appears to be suspiciously 
close to absolute status! 
The imposition of experimental problem solving in school 
is not really as liberating as Dewey's followers believed. The 
Amish and other fundamental religious groups may have 
difficulty applying the scientific method to all areas of life! 
Most other kinds of ethnocentricism admit to absolutism. 
The Classical Realist, Harry Broudy, clearly affirms that 
educators need to have a more certain and fundamental 
ground for aims for the good life than particular cultures. He 
holds that there is a "natural" structure independent of 
wishes, feelings, and desires; and that people can live 
according to that structure as reason gives them a sure 
grasp of its nature (Broudy, 1962, pp. 254-255). We are, in 
brief, to become rational masters of ourselves and our 
environments insofar as possible. 
Though Broudy's formulation appears generously broad 
at first, further examination of its ramifications reveals its 
ethnocentric character. Technologies of peoples differ 
considerably. Supposedly this would have something to do 
with degrees to which the environment would be mastered. 
Yet, is life in a higher technological society really better? It 
seems stress is certainly lower in so-called "primitive" 
societies. Is living longer always better? Is success always 
desirable? (That would certainly be connected with 
mastery.) 
Older forms of Idealism also had elements of ethno-
centrism. They tended to be gentler in degree of imposition 
than realist positions,,- because they made much of mental 
freedom and less of the natural environment. J. Donald 
Butler provides an example of an Idealist kind of imposition 
that is enthnocentric by first stating that absolute value is 
derived from the Christian God, and then stating: "The 
presupposition that ultimate values have their existence in 
and of God does not imply that our possession of them is 
automatic and without effort ... The individual only realizes 
values as [she] he enters into them" (Butler, 1962, p. 200). 
In other words, we are free to accept or reject the correct 
ways, but there is a correct way. 
Religious Idealists run the danger of imposing religion too 
narrowly. Their views are truly broad enough to permit 
efforts toward Christian unity, but they are not broad 
enough for efforts toward religious unity. They are 
ethnocentric in that they do not attain an intercultural level. 
Idealists of several kinds have imposed individuality. 
Immanuel Kant's formulation of the "categorical impera-
tive" (previously discussed) is an example of this. 
Individualism has been a very strong theme in Western 
cultures, particularly in European or Euro-American 
cultures. This has not been so in the East, nor has it been so 
in some communal groups of native Americans in the 
United States. Individuality is far from an intercultural 
concept. It is ethnocentric in character. 
I believe my view, perhaps characterized well enough as 
lntercultural Idealism, escapes ethnocentricity by advocat-
ing intercultural tolerance as its absolute principle. It also 
escapes the logical difficulties and anarchy of various ~in~s 
of Relativism. It simply declares that though we must live m 
cultures, we have the power to reason beyond their 
conflicts. 
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There is a distinct advantage in being the last discussant. 
It gives me the opportunity to point out that philosophy is a 
continuous, long-range debate between ideas emanating 
from different springboards of thought: springboards which 
can never be reconciled completely. For example, 
Democritus put forth a materialistic explanation of the world 
which Plato contested, and then Aristotle challenged 
Plato's view, and so on and on. The debate has waxed and 
waned for 2,300 years and shows no signs of diminishing. 
Numerous "isms" have been fostered. Some have been 
trivial, and some have replenished the main streams of 
thought. 
The vantage point occupied by Realism is that of an 
overview. It began as a kind of critique of other philosophies 
and was not trapped into reducing everything into too 
exclusive elements as several others were. Being later, it 
profited from ideas and "mistakes" of other philosophies. 
Of course, all philosophies have profited from the 
long-range debate, correcting errors and deepening their 
insights. But philosophical Realism claims it has an 
advantage, because it starts from the assumption that one 
cannot explain reality as just mental or material. Instead, it 
first claims that there is a world of material things not 
dependent for their existence on some mind being aware of 
them and secondly, there are many abstract entities or 
characteristics-signified, for example, by such terms as 
"red," "bigger than," "justice," "home," etc. -which exist 
whether minds know them or not (Breed, 1942, pp. 92-94). 
For instance, even if no one had ever thought of roundness, 
it would still exist in round things as long as there are objects 
characterized in this way. Consequently, Realism does not 
try to reduce everything to a mental or physical state, to the 
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result of a transaction between an organism and its 
environment, or to the process of existing. 
According to this Realistic springboard, values exist as 
such, and they are to be discovered, not made just for the 
sake of human convenience .. Discovery depends upon the 
independent nature of values and upon human powers of 
reasoning. That is, values are discoverable in whole, or in 
part, even if they do exist "out there," because they are not 
isolated from experience, personality, and circumstances. 
They are immanent in the activities of our daily lives and can 
be revealed through a study of them. So, how do we 
discover and study them? 
We start by analyzing "value." Early philosophers did not 
use this word but talked instead about good and bad, right 
and wrong, beauty and ugliness, or art and artlessness. 
Then the idea of value, meaning the worth of a thing, crept 
in from the discipline of economics; and in the nineteenth 
century, several philosophers argued that there is a 
common ground shared by ethics and esthetics, as well as 
by other aspects of life concerned with the worth of things. 
Besides values connected to rightness or beauty, there are 
religious, political, scientific, economic, and educational 
values. Furthermore, words like good, right, virtue, 
desirable, beauty, truth, honesty, and artistic can be 
classified as value terms, for they denote what people want. 
Words like bad, wrong, evil, undesirable, ugly, untrue, 
dishonest, and artless are disvalue terms, for they denote 
what people do not want. A value, then, is what we call an 
experience that enhances life. A disvalue is an experience 
that harms life. 
This answers the question whether educators "should 
impose values." (If that inflammatory word, "impose," had 
not been used in the title of this series, my essay would be 
easier to write; so, I shall ignore it temporarily.) Educators 
are responsible for directing students to enhancements of 
life and away from threats to life. The big question is: When 
should such direction take place? What is the best time for 
learning values? Should the time be guided by student 
maturation, by an innate system among values themselves, 
or by the advent of value-creating problem situations? 
Realists believe all three approaches are needed, for they 
complement each other. The maturation approach, which 
gets support from the work of Jean Piaget (1952), means 
that certain values are learned more easily at certain ages. 
For example, even very _ young children are aroused by 
questions of fairness, older boys and girls are interested in 
bravery, and adults debate temperance. The importance of 
this approach hinges upon the fact that one's value 
structure begins in infancy and continues throughout life as 
part of one's intellectual and emotional development. 
Humans probably spend more time in evaluating than in 
any other intellectual enterprise. Since it is a pervasive and 
life-long preoccupation, educators are well advised to 
capitalize upon those values common to age groups. As 
people grow older, their insights mature. Concepts of 
fairness grow into concepts of justice, bravery into courage, 
and endurance and temperance into self-control and 
tolerance. 
The second determinant of when is the value system 
itself. Some people argue about a hierarchy-whether 
ethical, esthetic, political, religious, and educational values 
are related, and whether or not some values are more 
important or fundamental. For instance, is honesty, beauty, 
or money most important? You could say that under some 
circumstances, honesty is most important, but under 
different circumstances, beauty of money is most 
important. However, if you say that values are relative to 
situations, you raise the question of whether or not anything 
is worth fighting or dying for. Is nothing so important that it 
takes precedence over everything else, no matter what the 
circumstances may be (Brandt, 1959)? On the other hand, 
when someone says, "He is a diamond in the rough," the 
implication is that some sterling characteristics, such as 
courage and honesty, do overshadow lesser characteristics, 
such as good manners and polite speech. 
Consequently, some people contend that there is some 
hierarchy and even a supreme value. This summum bonum, 
it is claimed, is not subordinate to other goods or values; it is 
something in which other goods are inclined or from which 
they can be derived. Happiness, patriotism, and obedience 
to the will of God have been some of the candidates for the 
position of supreme value. However, Realists shy away 
from such a reductionism, for they say a single highest 
good can become dogmatism and obstruct other important 
values-particularly when circumstances change. Hap-
piness, for instance, can lead to shallow pleasure seeking; 
patriotism has been used to stifle free speech and free 
religious practices; and the will of God has sometimes been 
interpreted by bigots. What is needed is some kind of 
balancing in which important values complement each 
other. 
Since Realists equate values with life-sustaining and 
life-enhancing, they emphasize health, economic self-
sufficiency, harmonious social relationships, productive 
knowledge and skills, beauty, and self-realization. One may 
not be able to enjoy every one of these to its fullest extent all 
of the time. In fact, one or more may be less than a person 
desires; but if the others compensate for the slackening of 
satisfaction, he or she can still be happy about the way 
things are going. At any rate, there should be enough 
worthy values and enough balance among them to sustain 
and enhance life. 
The third determinant of when values should be learned is 
the occurrence of value-creating problems. Every-day life 
forces us to make decisions concerning values. Parents start 
applying rewards and punishments to infants; and as 
children grow up, their brothers and sisters, playmates, and 
schoolmates add to the pressures. More or less informally, 
people participate in value decisions in the midst of family, 
political, and business problem situations. If they are keen 
observers, they notice one of the most puzzling characteris-
tics of values; sometimes they are used as means, and 
sometimes they serve as ends. A rising young politician may 
work hard at being truthful and courageous in order to win 
office. An actress may use her beauty and vivacity to charm 
the public. On the other hand, truth may be an end in itself 
to a scientist, and beauty may be an end in itself to a 
painter. 
Unlike truth and beauty, some things do not qualify as 
ends in themselves. Money and power, for example, are 
valuable (or disvaluable) as means but not a~ final ends. 
They are valuable when used to raise standards of health 
and literacy. They are disvaluable when used for destructive 
purposes. 
Now to get back to the word, "impose." Since some of 
its synonyms are "require," "demand," and "force upon," 
it is normally taken to signify that one person or group 
compels another person or group to accept something. 
Since we have already pointed out that educators are 
responsible for directing students toward what enhances life 
and away from what threatens life, there is no doubt that 
school systems, like parents, do in fact impose certain 
values upon students. These ought to be health, economic 
self-sufficiency, harmonious social relationships, productive 
knowledge and skills, beauty, and self-realization (achieving 
one's potential in some worthy ideal) . Some of these are 
embodied formally in school curricula. That is, several 
school subjects deal directly or indirectly with matters of 
health, economic self-sufficiency, and harmonious social 
relationships. The others do not always get as much 
attention, but they are not completly overlooked. A school 
that does not at least pay lip service to all these values (or 
values similar to them) would be hard to find. If they take 
their jobs seriously, school personnel discuss such values 
periodically and incorporate them into their stated 
objectives and aims. 
These are professional values-goods clothed in edu-
cational objectives and aims-which schools publicize as 
their reasons for being. But we should also consider sets of 
values that originate in disciplines, as well as in individuals. 
These two value-sets sometimes create highly visible 
controversies. 
Most disciplines have one or more topics which clash with 
common sense or with values upheld by some portions of 
the public. Today, for example, teachers of the life sciences 
are troubled by the evolution versus creation conflict. 
Historians and political scientists may wonder about some 
aspects of our national development and of the capitalist 
system. If they wonder too audibly, they may be called 
communists or fascists. Teachers of literature must be 
careful not to teach "immoral" stories or poems. There is 
nothing new about all of this. Scholarly and scientific 
investigations have challenged conventional wisdom and 
popular opinion for centuries, sometimes with dramatic 
results. Socrates was executed for "corrupting the morals 
of youth;" Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake for 
challenging church doctrine; and John T. Scopes of 
Tennessee was fired (dismissed from his job, I mean) for 
teaching the theory of evolution. 
These controversies hinge upon interpretations of 
morality and truth . On the one side, common sense and 
conventional wisdom say: "This is the way things are or 
should be." On the other side, scholarly and scientific 
investigators say: "Disciplined inquiry has resulted in a 
consensus of those who are best informed that this is the 
way things are or should be." Of course, some disputes are 
more wars of words than of basic principles. Differences 
may result, at least in part, from misunderstood terms and 
confused definitions. When, however, the dispute hinges 
upon unreconcilable principles, the Realist calms himself or 
herself with the knowledge that although truth doesn't 
always triumph, it has an advantage over untruth; truth will 
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keep "popping up" as different people in different places 
and times keep on discovering and rediscovering it (Mill, 
1947). Eventually, it will wear out the opposition, for truth is 
that characteristic of a statement which makes it depict 
reality. 
The "moral" aspects of these disciplinary controversies 
are made more difficult to resolve, because they are usually 
judged within the context of social standards which can 
change rapidly. Today, morality is most often associated 
with sex. This is a narrowed application, for morals embrace 
all kinds of behavior between people. (One cannot be moral 
or immoral to one's self, to nature, or to God, although one 
can be harmful or irreverent to these.) Thus, moral behavior 
does not harm social relations. Immoral behavior does. 
The other value-set is personal and private-the value 
systems of individual teachers, counselors, and administra-
tors. When can these people impose their own concepts of 
what is good and worthy upon students and their 
professional colleagues? If their private values coincide with 
professional and disciplinary values, there is little to worry 
about. However, this is not always the case. Fortunately, 
some professional educational organizations offer some 
assistance and advice in this matter. The National Education 
Association publishes a code of ethics for teachers in its 
annual NEA Handbook for Teachers; there is also a code of 
ethics for administrators in the AASA Code of Ethics (1966), 
and one for counselors in the Personnel and Guidance 
Journal ( 1971). All three codes lay down regulations for the 
behaviors of practitioners toward students, colleagues, and 
the public. While they evade questions of imposition by 
talking about democratic procedures, the implication is that 
the pressures of majority opinion do impose values. This is 
the most widely accepted answer to the questions of 
whether or not imposition is desirable. 
However, it does not really answer questions of when it is 
desirable to impose one's own values. And I am not sure 
that there is one final answer. This must be the reason 
several discussants were asked to respond to the topic. Still, 
the Realist concludes that his is the best current answer. 
Those people who contend that people instinctively 
resent imposition-therefore, it is impossible-ignore two 
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facts. One is that imposition is not necessarily. a harsh force. 
It can be gentle, inconspicuous, and tactful. What it means 
for education is persistent presentation adapted to the 
abilities of the recipient. The other fact is that imposition is a 
fact of life. Society, family life, and government constantly 
impose. All of us receive weather changes, taxes, war, 
laws, and behavior patterns, whether we want to receive 
them or not. Learning to adjust to unavoidable impositions 
is one of the most important lessons of life. 
Those philosophers who try to substitute democratic 
and problem-solving processes for imposition are attempt-
ing something of a coverup. When democratic and 
problem-solving processes for imposition are interpreted to 
mean that students, teachers, counselors, and admini-
strators should participate equally in learning, another 
important fact is ignored. The only equal starting place for 
all of us is ignorance. But civilizations need several 
thousands of years to develop. Such an interpretation 
would put every generation back into the position of the 
cave man; each would have to re-invent the wheel. Since 
wheels are easier to re-invent than our present value 
system, the advocates of this position have been forced to 
modify their philosophy. Instead of trying to re-invent, they 
advocate that we re-discover the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, 
Kant, Mill, and others who have thought deeply about 
values. What is this but a kind of imposition? 
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PART II: CRITIQUES 
A Realistic Critique 
F. R. McKenna 
Dr. Sutton said a liberating education may impose the 
values of cultural competence and intercultural tolerance 
upon students. This is a generous view insofar as it respects 
cultural differences. It is a liberating one if one of the 
cultural "competencies" is not to hate other cultures. And I 
am sure he is right in maintaining that everyone needs to 
feel comfortable within some culture, and that intercultural 
tolerance is important to civilized life. 
Furthermore, I agree that adults, particularly parents and 
teachers, must impose some values on children. As he said, 
some values must be imposed in order to provide a structure 
for freedom. The main question, then, is "which values?" 
He chose cultural competence and intercultural tolerance. 
He might have chosen more specific values such as 
business success, patriotism, religious hegemony, or 
improved health standards-all of which could be part of 
the cultural framework of some society. Instead, he chose 
much more generalized values to impose. 
The generality is a problem. Dr. Sutton knows that some 
cultures are not worth emulating; after all, he deplored the 
culture of National Socialist Germany and he knows all 
cultures have some features that are better left untaught. 
And he must know that some people renounce the cultures 
into which they are born in order to move into other 
cultures, because these are judged to be better. 
In other words, don't we all know that some cultures are 
superior and some are inferior? Should we be tolerant of a 
culture in which violence and deceit are admired modes of 
behavior? Even though Dr. Sutton did condemn the 
National Socialist regime, he concludes his essay by 
advocating intercultural tolerance as an absolute principle. 
So, I cannot resist asking if he would tolerate a culture 
which is intolerant of all other cultures. 
I do not think it would do him any good to argue, as he 
did in his conclusion, that "though we must live in cultures, 
we have the power to reason beyond their conflicts." His 
statement needs clarification. If it means that by powers of 
reason we can live without cultural conflicts in a world of 
cultural conflicts, he is contradicting himself. 
Dr. Stuart provided us with clear and useful applications 
of a general principle he derived from Kant's moral 
philosophy: our actions should be such as to respect others 
as free and rational beings; to treat others as ends and not 
merely as means to our own ends. He chose to answer the 
question about imposing values, which was assigned to all 
of us, by falling back upon a maxim for regulating thought 
about our actions rather than resorting to rules for 
regulating actions of themselves. This was a wise decision. 
Had he chosen one or more rules for actions such as, do not 
kill; do not steal; be loving; be frugal; etc. , he would have 
been forced to note all of the exceptions to the rule, the 
conditions under which the rule would apply, and end up 
negating his reasons for imposing values. 
That is, if he had taken up such a rule as "Do not kill," he 
would have become involved in such issues as warfare, 
abortion, suicide, euthanasia, and self defense. By the time 
all of the reasons for and against all kinds of killings had 
been explored, the result would have been a mass of 
contradictions. Even if less drastic acts were singled out to 
be ruled for and against, such as loving and punctuality, the 
number of contradictions would be more confusing than 
helpful. So he was wise in choosing a fundamental maxim 
for guiding thinking about all kinds of rules for behavior. 
This is especially necessary when we narrow kinds of 
behavior down to those we normally consider moral or 
immoral. These behaviors are those interactions and 
transactions between people which enhance or threaten life 
and well-being. Such actions may be overt or covert, 
corporeal or linguistic; they may evoke mental and/or 
physical feelings, and involve few or many people. And 
when we specify professional, as well as personal moral 
behaviors, we add to the numbers and diversity of 
prescribings. 
Reference to professional behaviors brings up a matter 
obscured by the original question to which we discussants 
are responding. The question focuses attention upon how 
we as teachers, counselors, and administrators behave 
toward students. What are the effects upon students when 
we impose our values? We also ought to think about the 
effects upon us. 
Dr. Stuart, for example, discussed effects upon a high 
school class when three students were disruptive and upon 
Mary when her counselor imposed values without giving 
Mary opportunity to choose. Probably, he did so because he 
followed so carefully his principle to respect others as free 
and rational beings. But in doing so, he said nothing about 
self respect, which is part of Kant's original maxim. Kant 
said, "Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of another, always as an end, never 
as merely a means." Not only should we not use others just 
as means, but we should not allow others to use us in a like 
manner. 
The young high school teacher with the discipline 
problem was lacking in self-respect when he permitted the 
three noisy students to damage his work as an instructor. 
He should have respected his own duty enough to prevent 
its disruption. Likewise, Ms. Watson should respect herself 
as a counselor, the position she was hired to fill, and 
perform as one in providing information from which Mary 
could make a choice. When she put her anti-abortion 
feelings ahead of her advisory duties, Ms. Watson was 
disrespectful to herself as a counselor. 
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The advantage of Kant's maxim over Dr. Stuart's version 
is that of double protection. Each of us is responsible for 
treating other people as ends, and each of us is responsible 
for other people treating us as ends. If the other people 
neglect their obligation to us, it is our duty to see that we 
still are treated as ends. 
Explanations of how Existentialism works fascinate me, 
even though I remain unconverted. Dr. Barger minced no 
words when he said values cannot be imposed, because 
only the individual can determine what his or her good is; 
therefore, only the individual can know what values will best 
serve that good. In a sense he supplied what I criticized Dr. 
Stuart for omitting, the individual's responsibility to himself; 
every mature person is first of all accountable for his or her 
own actions. This is a refreshing view in an era accustomed 
to blaming parents, society, depressions, uncontrollable 
passions, etc. as the reasons one acts as one does. 
Determinism, Existentialists say, may be the basic fabric of 
the physical universe, but not of man. Humans can choose. 
Pragmatists also emphasize the ability to choose but, 
according to Dr. Barger, they are not the rugged 
individualists that Existentialists are. For when questions of 
value come up, Pragmatists appeal to consensus, whereas 
Existentialists appeal to individual judgment. That is, 
Pragmatists believe that values are social agreements, 
because the individual is basically part of the group. 
Existentialists, on the other hand, believe that values are 
personal decisions, because the group is basically an 
assembly of individuals. 
These two points of view-the individual is basically part 
of the group versus the group is basically an assembly of 
individuals-oversimplify a complex proposition. Presum-
ably, "group" means some individuals who interact 
sufficiently to be indentified as interacting. Pragmatists 
emphasize the group aspect, Existentialists emphasize the 
individual aspect; but Realists emphasize the interacting 
which is to say that interactions are of the group and of the 
individual. Also, say the Realists, interactions are between 
humans and non-human aspects of the environment. So, 
values derive from investigating the worth to existence of all 
kinds of interactions. Contrary to Existentialists' thinking, 
humans do not create values; they only contribute to 
creating some of them.,_ 
But while I think highly of Existentialism for sensitizing the 
rest of us to the ideas that existence precedes essence, that 
loneliness is a fact of life with which we must live, and that 
humans are primarily responsible for themselves, I cannot 
buy the idea that viewpoints are basically matters of faith or 
belief. This latter idea may be suggested by Heisenberg's 
"Uncertainty Principle," but it is not supported by the 
principle. Heisenberg said it is impossible to measure the 
position and velocity of a particle simultaneously with more 
than strictly limited precision. This principle of atomic 
physics may suggest that an observer in a paradigm can 
never be completely objective in his observations, because 
he is never outside his paradigm. But does it apply outside 
26 
of the physical sciences? Even if it should work elsewhere, 
does it make all observations subjective and relative? No 
Realist would agree. There is enough permanency, 
sameness, and stability in the universe to be experienced 
alike by humans and to be expressed objectively. One proof 
of this is the fact that we can talk together about many 
things. 
Finally, I wish to compare my thinking with that of the 
other discussants. I notice that they started their essays 
with their versions of the stimulant question, and two of 
them immediately answered it. I quote them: "The view that 
some values should be imposed for freedom's sake might 
seem to be a contradiction."; "When should one, as an 
educator, impose his or her values upon students, clients, or 
staff members?"; "The question, 'What values should be 
imposed on a person for his/her own good?' can be 
answered quite simple: none at all!". Dr. Sutton said some 
values should be imposed. Dr. Stuart asked when should 
values be imposed. Dr. Barger said no values can be 
imposed. I did not start coping with whether and when until 
I was nearly one-quarter of the way into my essay. 
As one reads each essay, it becomes apparent that every 
discussant understands the question somewhat differently. 
Was that because the question was not framed clearly, or 
because each of us brought a different viewpoint to his 
reading of it, or was it both of these? I want to expatiate a 
little on both possibilities but especially on the different 
viewpoints brought to bear upon the question. 
Although I profited from reading and criticizing the other 
essays, I wonder why more attention was not given to 
discussing what values really are, to the difference between 
"should" and "could," and to the several meanings of 
"impose." More investigation of these might have clarified 
the question, and we might have agreed upon the scope of 
imposition which is certainly a key concept. 
It is tradional to compare philosophical differences by 
contrasting their metaphysical bases or their results. 
However, I want to resort to the opening statement of my 
essay. Historically, all viewpoints profit from the continuing 
debate, which is what philosophy really is. Terms and 
concepts are improved, some excesses are toned down, 
and some spark new lines of thought. Ideas are tested by 
being put to work. All viewpoints profit from the historical 
process; but in different ways. In a sense, Realism is the 
historical process. It is not a kind of Naturalism brought up 
to date, nor is it any more of an ancestor of Pragmatism 
than Idealism. But it is the position, beginning with 
Aristotle, that we cannot reduce explanations of the 
universe to overemphasize one dimension, such as mind, 
matter, experience, or existence. The universe is all of these 
and more. 
So, when Realists talk about values and disvalues they 
say that some are created, some are inherited, and some are 
discovered. Some are imposed, some are freely acquired, 
and some are rejected. The big question is how we may 
learn to distinguish between worthy and unworthy values. 
Defense of an lntercultural Perspective 
Kenneth Sutton 
Dr. Barger's view is very much at home in our pluralistic 
world. His willingness to see needs from other people's 
perspectives is commendable. 
His individualism also could find a home in some of the 
more dominant cultures in this country. Freedom to choose 
and responsiblity for choices made are familiar themes in the 
lives of many. This means Dr. Barger's thoughts have 
enormous clarifying potential. -
Yet, this same individualism can amount to an 
ethnocentric imposition whenever it is applied in communal 
societies. (There are some of these in the United States.) 
For instance, some Pueblo peoples of the Southwest are 
much more inclined to form a self concept around 
membership in an extended family or clan group than are 
Euroamericans and Black Americans. They are also less 
motivated by individual competition and tend to ascribe less 
personal responsibility for actions. 
Contrary to what seems implicit in his view, individuals 
are not more fundamental than cultures in any objective 
sense. Humans are helpless at birth, and must be 
maintained in terms of a given way of life. They are never 
able to function apart from cultural contexts. A particular 
culture can be transcended only by gaining an intercultural 
perspective. This, however, is not an achievement of some 
splendid independence from the cultural factor as much as it 
is a broadening of cultural participation. 
Also, Dr. Barger's Existentialism provides little basis for 
the prevention of anarchy in the schools and elsewhere. If 
really meaning a choice makes it right, and two students 
meant to fight each other, he couldn't do much to stop it 
without violating his intention to extend the right of free 
decision. The students could stop the fight with new, free 
decisions. Thus, the best Dr. Barger could do would be to 
remind each at the point of onslaught that he or she is 
personally responsible for whatever happens. This doesn't 
work very often when student commitment is intense. 
I believe my views offer more true freedom than 
Existentialism, providing for overt control in cases of 
conflict. At the same t ime, they, are not as suspect-by 
virtue of their intercultural perspective-of being ethno-
centric. 
Dr. Stuart is willing to intervene between, correct, or 
even to dispute with students and others as long as he truly 
maintains respect for their subject status or personhood. 
This is a position conducive to a sane, well-balanced 
educational process. 
He draws, as I do, from the rational ethics of Immanuel 
Kant. I concur with him that this approach has fewer 
disadvantages than others, generally at least. 
However, Dr. Stuart thought it best to leave Kant's 
statement of the general ethical principle (categorical 
imperative) alone. I revised it. 
If we only sought to treat everyone as subjects rather than 
objects as Kant and Stuart suggest, individualistic societies 
would be served; but those in communal societies would 
not view the practice as a great favor. Also, one must 
consider societies of an extreme pragmatic inclination 
where just about everything is a means rather than an end in 
itself. 
I am more than suggesting that the act of honoring the 
subject status of everyone cannot be willed for all peoples. It 
is too ethnocentric to be a general ethical principle or 
categorical imperative. I submit that my intercultural 
tolerance is more inclusive and, thus, more nearly merits the 
general ethical principle designation. 
I am pleased with the avoidance of extremes in Dr. 
McKenna's type of Realism. Some of the "new" or 
"scientific" versions of that philosophy come very close to 
reducing everything to the physical. By comparison, Dr. 
McKenna gains greater balance, more ability to use aspects 
of philosophies other than Realism, and a greater generosity 
toward variety. 
I agree with him that freedom requires a structure, certain 
enforced limits; but I think we disagree to some extent 
concerning where to draw the boundaries of freedom's 
structure. He emphasizes imposition of that which is life 
sustaining and life enhancing. I stress competence within 
given cultures and tolerance between cultures as the areas 
where values can be imposed. 
While it seems to me our positions have many areas of 
potential agreement, there could be points of significant 
conflict. Some cultures do not sustain life as well as others, 
due to the type of medicine they practice or their religious 
beliefs. There are also cultures that do not emphasize 
material security and attainment as much as others. Dr. 
McKenna equates values with the sustaining and enhance-
ment of life. On the basis of this, it seems he would alter 
such cultures. I hold that the cultures are as legitimate as 
others as far as anyone can know or demonstrate, and I 
would interact with them on their terms. 
We cannot fairly judge a culture from the outside. Is it 
really better to sustain life in all circumstances? It appears to 
me that we can protect ourselves to the point where life is 
hardly worth living, but this will vary according to cultural 
perspectives. 
Also, there is a great deal of difference between cultures 
on the subject of life enhancement. Some, such as Zen 
Buddhists, do not seek to enhance life at all. They simply let 
it be. It is not difficult to imagine that they may be wise to do 
so; but, again, wisdom varies from culture to culture. 
Though Dr. McKenna prudently permits imposition of 
values on broad bases, I do not believe them broad enough 
to avoid occasions of ethnocentricity. I can't see the 
demonstration of the objectivity of his central values. 
Cultures can be judged from an intercultural perspective. 
Anyone who has enjoyed a breadth of cultural participation 
to permit holding values of intercultural tolerance can clearly 
see the wrong when cultures fail to tolerate each other. And 
this is not, by its very definition, a judgment that is walled in 
by a specific cultural boundary. 
The value of competence within given cultures is mainly 
of transitional importance. All of us must begin our lives in 
terms of specific cultures. As we gain competence in these 
terms, we gradually mature to the point of intercultural life. 
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It is then that the higher value of intercultural tolerance 
becomes possible to us. 
Generally, my views may be distinguished from those of 
the other authors by breadth of perspective. The breadth of 
my views even permits me to utilize the perspectives of my 
co-authors. 
The individualism of Existentialism and respect for 
persons in Kantian Idealism certainly hold values palatable 
to many cultures, including my own. Realism, with its 
emphasis upon objective values built upon the foundation of 
that which sustains and enhances life also has broad cultural 
application. 
I have long been interested in how different ways of 
looking at things have persisted through the centuries and 
how none has really vanquished the others. Could each 
have "homes" and support in different cultures? 
I have also been interested for a long time in what people 
call the "philosophical attitude." At this point, the readers 
are quite aware of clashes between the authors of this 
edition. They may not know that all of this is going on in the 
best of humor and friendship. Seeking the truth involves a 
struggle, but seekers of truth have reason to respect each 
other. It is usually the way of those who deal with 
philosophy. I -wish it could be the way of interaction 
between cultures. I would be proud if we who educate 
others could have significant roles in bringing it about. 
In Defense of Individual Relativism 
Robert Newton Barger 
Professor Stuart, in his article, bases his approach to the 
question of imposition of values on Immanuel Kant's 
principle that we should always treat others as ends and 
never as means. Stated in this basic form, Kant's principle 
fits in quite well with the Existentialistic approach that I have 
advocated. This is because the true Existentialist is not only 
concerned with himself or herself. The true Existentialist 
understands that each person is an autonomous human 
being, and therefore, each person is entitled to the kind of 
autonomous decision-making process that the Existentialist 
claims for himself or herself. Kant's principle, then, 
comports well with the Existentialist notion that one should 
never impose on another's freedom by forcing someone to 
accept a given view of reality, truth, or value. I agree with 
Professor Stuart that this does not mean that a person 
should never intervene in the actions of another. If an 
Existentialist were to intervene in another person's actions 
in order to insure the Existentialist's or a third party's 
freedom to choose personal reality, truth, or value, this 
intervention should not properly be called an "imposition of 
values" on that person. In fact, what the Existentialist 
would be doing by this intervention would be preventing the 
imposition of values. 
I do have one area of disagreement with Professor 
Stuart's position. From the standpoint of his Kantian 
analysis, Professor Stuart sees the person as essentially one 
who has the ability to think. Hence, he sees the trait of 
rationality as the essential human characteristic. However, 
the Existentialist would not define a person so primarily in 
terms of mind. Freedom, according to the Existentialist, 
does involve room for consideration of desires and 
inclinations, in addition to more "rational" considerations, 
when it is time for choices to be made. The human person is 
a creature of emotionality, as well as of rationality. 
Professor Stuart's position is, thus, a bit too idealistic to 
elicit total approval from an Existentialist. 
Professor Sutton, in his article, has begun the formulation 
of a position that promises to break new ground in the field 
of moral philosophy. This kind of pioneering work is a task 
too seldom undertaken today. He is to be commended for 
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using this forum to sketch out his original ideas. While I will 
be forced to take serious exception to some of these ideas, I 
do so with profound respect for the creative endeavor that 
he has begun here and with the hope that my criticisms may 
be of assistance in carrying forward further work on this 
theory. 
I am in agreement with Professor Sutton's stress on the 
general principle of tolerance, as should be evident from my 
previous comments on Professor Stuart's article. My first 
problem, however, concerns Professor Sutton's reference 
to the absoluteness of the principle of tolerance only in 
regard to "intercultural" tolerance. I would think, if the 
principle of tolerance is to be absolute, that it must apply at 
all times and in all sitt.:ations and, thus, must include 
relations between persons and not only relations between 
cultures. Is it not too limiting to speak of an absolute 
principle of intercultural tolerance? Think, for instance, of a 
culture which might hold individual autonomy as its highest 
value. Tolerating such a culture in accord with the 
above-mentioned principle would thereby involve tolerating 
individual autonomy, and thus, the principle would broaden 
out to an absolute principle of tolerance without being 
limited only to intercultural tolerance. 
My second problem is that Professor Sutton's position 
seems to make culture absolute, at least in the early stages 
of the child's development. If this is the case, his theory falls 
subject to the criticism of Ethical Relativism which Professor 
Stuart has so well put forward in his article. Also associated 
with this problem is the question of the role of subcultures. 
Is it just cultures that are to be tolerated, and not 
subcultures, too? If so, where is one to draw the line 
between the two? 
My third problem is a practical, rather than theoretical, 
one. Why is education to be monocultural in elementary 
schools and multicultural in secondary schools? Even given 
Professor Sutton's theory, cannot the appreciation of other 
cultures properly begin in elementary school at the same 
time that one is gaining a sense of identity with one's own 
culture? 
My last problem is the most serious one. Why are 
individuals within a culture expected to conform to the 
culture, while cultures are not expected to conform to any 
super-cultural norm? The answer would seem to be that 
Professor Sutton regards cultures, rather than individuals, 
as the primary units of society. On the basic question 
regarding this point: whether a group is to be defined in 
terms of its constituent individuals or whether the individual 
is to be defined in terms of the group of which he or she is a 
part, Professor Sutton comes down on the side of the group 
as being the basic element of definition. I know this, in fact, 
to be his position from personal discussions that I have had 
with him . This position explains his belief, stated near the 
end of his article, that individuality is ethnocentric in 
character. This is only the case, however, if one adopts 
Professor Sutton 's view that the group is more primary than 
is the individual, a view to which an Existentialist would not, 
of course, adhere. 
I would like to respond to Professor Sutton's concern that 
the practice of Existentialism in a school might result in 
anarchy. Anarchy is not a necessary result of Existentialism. 
As I indicated in commenting on Professor Stuart's article, 
intervention might be practiced by an Existentialist, on 
occasion, for the sake of protecting another person's 
freedom. In this regard, the maintenance of a learning 
atmosphere in a classroom would not be antithetical to an 
Existentialist stance. As I also mentioned, the forcing of 
people to choose their own values should not properly be 
referred to as "imposing values." 
Finally, although I regard the Existentialist positi6'h as 
preferable to Professor Sutton's lntercultural Idealism 
because of Existentialism's regard for the autonomy of the 
individual , I want to conclude my remarks by wondering if 
there are not potential grounds for a compromise between 
Professor Sutton's position and my own. Although he sees 
the group as primary and I see the individual as primary, we 
may both be wrong. Stated more positively, we may both 
be only partially correct . Consider, for example, the 
possibility that the individual and the group might be equally 
important . Unfortunately, the pursuit of this possibility 
would take us beyond the scope of the present project. 
Professor McKenna states in his article that Realism is an 
overview that is not trapped into reducing everything to two 
exclusive elements . He is, in my view, quite correct in 
pointing out the superiority of the comprehensive Realistic 
view over a number of more simplistic philosophica! 
outlooks. Despite its sophisticated stature, however, an 
Existentialist must register an objection to the Realist 
outlook . The Existentialist must simply deny that values 
exist objectively in things and are there waiting to be 
discovered. Consider, for example, Professor McKenna's 
definition of a value as " an experience that enhances life" 
and a disvalue as "an experience that harms life ." The 
Existentialist would comment that those things which serve 
as enhancements to life or threats to life must be decided 
upon by each individual person, because the meaning of 
"life" must be defined by each individual person and, 
therefore, will be different for each individual person. Thus, 
something is only a value or a disvalue if it is chosen as such 
by a given individual. Contrary to the Realist outlook, a 
thing has no " value" in itself and does not become a value 
until it is chosen as such by a given individual. A Realist 
world of objective pre-defined values may seem like an 
easier world in which to make decisions, because what is 
"good" and what is "bad" already exist as such. Choices 
can, therefore, be based on objective knowledge. 
Unfortunately, according to the Existentialist, that is not the 
way the world is . 
To sum up, the Existentialist could agree with the 
principle of treating others as ends rather than means but 
would find the Idealist emphasis on rationality in connection 
with this principle to be somewhat incomplete. The 
Existentialist could also agree with the principle of tolerance 
put forward by lntercultural Idealism but would object to 
limiting it only to intercultural tolerance. Finally, while 
recognizing the synthetic achievements of Realism, the 
Existentialist would disagree with its definition of values as 
fixed and objective. In short, one cannot lean solely on 
reason , society, or the spiritual / material world in order to 
discover values. One must individually create them. To hand 
over one's freedom and allow imposition from any other 
source would be to side with the heretical views of 
Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor. 
Relativist, Existentialist, and Realist Views 
on Imposing Values: A Critique 
James D. Stuart 
Professor Sutton begins his paper admirably with the 
insight that imposing values cannot be avoided. The 
controlling question, then, is not whether we should ever 
impose values, but what sorts of values should be imposed 
and under what circumstances is such imposition justified. 
If we lived in a world of perfectly rational and moral human 
beings, there would be no need for values to be imposed. In 
such a world, everyone would pursue only rational and 
moral ends, and more importantly, there )IVOuld never be a 
conflict between persons and their ends. In an ideal world of 
this sort, there could exist absolute freedom, since there 
would be no need for laws which restrict freedom. In the 
real world of less than perfect human beings, however, such 
absolute freedom is sheer illusion. 
The contention that we must have laws which restrict our 
freedom in order to maximize our freedom is, of course, 
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paradoxical. Yet, the recognition that laws governing the 
behavior of human beings must exist and be generally 
obeyed, if we are to be free, forms the basis for the 
justification of forming civil societies. In John Locke's 
version of the social contract theory, for example, the claim 
is that this is why one would choose to leave the state of 
nature in which there are no laws or powers to enforce them 
and enter into a society where such laws exist. According to 
this view, freedom exists to a greater extent in society than 
in the state of nature, even though its laws are imposed 
upon those living in society . 
Professor Sutton's position on imposing values, as I 
understand it, does not exactly reflect Locke's social 
contract view, but it is similar. Both views recognize the 
truth of the paradox of freedom; some freedom must be 
sacrificed if freedom is to exist. The basic difference is that 
he talks about imposing values for the good of the person. 
Here, unlike Locke's social contract justification for 
imposing values, there is supposed to be a direct benefit to 
the person upon whom the values are imposed instead of an 
indirect benefit derived from others being restrained from 
interfering with one's goals. 
In Sutton's view, persons have certain limitations if they 
are not competent in their cultures, and the job of the 
educator is to remove that incompetence, even if that 
involves imposing values on them. This is justified, he 
insists, because cultural incompetence entails limitations, 
and if a person has limitations, he or she is not really free. 
Thus, the ultimate justification for the imposition of values is 
an increase in the total freedom of the individual upon 
whom the values are being imposed. 
This suggests that Professor Sutton might be advocating 
imposing the competencies of a person's cultures on an 
individual even if that person's sub-culture does not value 
such competencies. This possiblity can be illustrated as 
follows: Suppose that there is a minority student whose 
sub-culture does not value just those competencies which, 
in the opinion of the educator, are required to succeed in the 
larger culture of that student. Sutton appears to be saying 
that the educator is justified in imposing those values which 
are necessary for attaining cultural competence . Yet, he 
rejects "cultural chauvinism," . which makes me hesitant 
about attributing such a view to him. So, we may ask, is the 
educator justified in imposing the values of cultural 
competence in this case or not? If not, it looks as if there will 
be many cases in which cultural competence cannot be the 
goal of the educator. If the educator is justified in imposing 
these values, even though they are not valued by the 
individual 's sub-culture, how is "cultural chauvinism" to be 
avoided? 
In the final analysis, I think Professor Sutton's 
justification for imposing values reflects the social contract 
justification as employed by Rousseau , rather than as 
employed by Locke. Locke saw the justification in terms of 
the laws of society providing for one person 's protection 
from others and in terms of providing for an impartial way of 
settling disputes. Rousseau, in contrast, speaks of being 
" forced to be free." In other words, he speaks of being 
forced to do things, because they are good for you, even 
though one might not want to do them. Sutton's contention 
that the educator is justified in imposing the values of 
cultural competence in order to bring about freedom 
reminds one of Rousseau , rather than Locke. This involves a 
much deeper paradox of freedom if it is really freedom at al l. 
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In contrast to Professor Sutton's answer, Professor 
Barger answers the question, "When should values be 
imposed?" by denying the assumption implicit in the 
question. That is, he denies that any values should ever be 
imposed. Arguing from an Existentialist perspective, he 
claims that imposing values from without cannot be for the 
person's own good and, therefore, values should never be 
imposed. 
Professor Barger's worry about imposing values is 
certainly a significant one and one which must be dealt with 
in any position that favors the imposition of values. If 
individuals act in certain ways only because they are 
required to, and especially if they have strong aversion to 
such acts, they are not likely to become authentic persons. 
Authentic persons are those who act according to their own 
desires rather than acting from the desires of others. It is 
perhaps appropriate to point out that much, if not all, of this 
insight is captured in Kant's principle that we should treat 
individuals as persons and not things. Part of what that 
involves is that we should take into account the desires of 
others in our treatment of them and should not treat them 
as mere objects. 
The major difference between the Existentialist and 
Kantian accounts is that in the latter's view the restriction 
concerning the imposition of values is not absolute. That is, 
in general, I am to refrain from ignoring the desires of others 
and imposing my values upon them. This is demanded by 
my recognition of others as persons and not things. 
However, there are times, Kant would argue, when certain 
values must be imposed upon others. If someone, for 
instance, is about to act out his or her desires to do serious 
bodily harm to another individual, then that person's desires 
should be interfered with. In other words, values contrary 
to those held by the person about to harm another ought to 
be imposed, and this is true even if it means the person 
whose desires are being thwarted becomes less authentic 
than he or she might otherwise have been. On the Kantian 
view, what justifies interfering with the freedom of the 
assailant is that we are acting to prevent an intrusion on 
another person's freedom. 
Professor Barger points out that Existentialists do not 
believe that there is a "Grand Plan of Goodness," but values 
are created by individuals through the choices they make. 
Since the individual chooses his or her own values, and 
there is no "Grand Plan," values should not be imposed. 
But the question of whether values should be imposed does 
not depend completely upon whether there is a set of 
" correct" values to which each of us ought to be subject. 
For, even if such values did exist, it could still be argued that 
they should not be imposed . Rather, it could be held that 
each person should be allowed to discover such values 
alone. Conversely, even if there is no " Grand Plan of 
Goodness," as maintained by the Existentialists, one could 
still argue that some values should be imposed. 
I claimed earlier that one cannot totally avoid imposing 
values and, therefore, the important question is what values 
should be imposed and under what circumstances. Given 
that values must be imposed, we ought to take seriously 
Professor Barger's worry concerning the potential damage 
this could do to the individual and attempt to avoid an 
imposition of values which might involve a person having to 
deny his or her own values and identity. 
Professor McKenna agrees that it is impossible fQr an 
educator to completely avoid imposing values. Thus, again, 
the question is, "How do we identify the values which 
should be imposed and the proper circumstances which call 
for their imposition?" It should be noted that, unlike 
professors Sutton and Barger, McKenna believes that a 
correct set of values exists and is, moreover, optimistic 
about our ability to finally discover them. 
How do we determine the correct values for imposition? 
McKenna's answer is both direct and, I think, unsatisfac-
tory. If the educator selects professional and disciplinary 
values for imposition, McKenna assures us, there is little to 
worry about. "The imposition is right." He refers us to the 
National Education Association code for teachers and 
mentions that there are similar codes for administrators and 
counselors. McKenna admits that he has no answer to the 
question of when values should be imposed. 
Although professional codes may be quite adequate in 
spelling out a desirable set of educational values, it does not 
follow that they should be imposed. It may be that some or 
all of these values should be goals without it ever being the 
case that they should be imposed on others. Professional 
codes, then, are not adequate guides regarding what values 
are to be imposed. Also, as we have seen, Professor 
Mc Kenna agrees that they do not tell us when values should 
be imposed. Therefore, unless one is willing to assume that 
professional codes articulate the correct values and that all 
of these should be imposed, one cannot accept this view as 
an adequate answer to the question of values imposition . In 
any case, we would want to know why a · certain set of 
values is the right one, and the fact that they are listed in an 
official code is hardly an adequate answer to this question. 
After seriously considering each of the above alternatives 
to the Kantian position, I remain convinced, largely for the 
reasons just given, that Kantianism offers the best 
guidance to the question of value imposition. This should 
not be taken to imply that I believe that there are no 
difficulties with the Kantian view. Nevertheless, the 
principle that we should always treat others as ends or 
persons and not merely as a means, when correctly 
understood, provides a useful criterion for determining what 
values may be imposed and when it is permissible for them 
to be imposed . I find the alternative positions less helpful in 
dealing with either one or both of these issues. 
ESTRANGED PROFESSORIATES 
Probably all of us are aware to some extent of the recent criticism of our nation's schools, their teachers, and the institutions which prepare those teachers. The 
discontent runs deep and the quality of American education has become a key national issue. The year 1983 has been dubbed as " the year of the study." You have 
heard of the report, " A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform." It is only one of at least five current, major task force reports dealing with education. The 
pace of such deliberations at the state level also is quickening and decisions are in the offing that will impact upon teacher preparation programs. Hopefully, we will have 
an opportunity to influence those decisions. The following "gem" is excerpted from "Teacher education in 1983: an overview," Basic Education, May, 1983. 
We have yet to meet a teacher educator who does not affirm the 
importance of subject mastery. In February, the American 
Association of Colleges for Teacher Education published "Profile 
of a Beginning Teacher," outlining "the knowledge and skills that 
should be quaranteed by graduation from a teacher education 
program." The profile makes clear, "it is the professional studies 
component that transforms the educated individual into a 
professional teacher," and goes on to devote six pages to that 
matter, half of them given to "generic and specialized pedagogical 
knowledge and skills." Where their treasure is, there will be the 
hearts of teacher educators. 
And where will be the treasure and hearts of those masters of 
subjects, the professors of arts and sciences? For the most part, 
their treasure has been in their subjects, their hearts not much in 
the training of schoolteachers, and there is little to suggest that 
they will have a change of heart. 
Of course there are outstanding exceptions. Just as there always 
have been professors of education whose interest in the substance 
of schoolteaching is more than perfunctory, so there have been 
and are doctors of philosophy dedicated to the task of preparing 
teachers. It is because they are exceptions that they stand out, 
however. 
It is our persuasion that a central failure of teacher education has 
been the lack of collaboration on the parts of the doctors of 
philosophy and the doctors of education. John R. Palmer is not so 
persuaded. Dr. Palmer is dean of the School of Education at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, where "more faculty across the 
campus are coming to us wanting to get involved in teacher 
education ." 
If university faculty members across the country wanted to get 
involved in teacher education, we could share Dean Palmer's hope 
that able students may be more inclined to consider teaching as a 
career. 
Describing teacher education as "a weak chain with a few 
strong links," David Stewart of the English Department at Texas A 
& M University proposes "shifting teacher education to the 
academic disciplines" and so "forge a new chain that would retain 
the strong links of the old by including them in discipline-based 
programs." Responding, Dean Robert Stout of the College of 
Education at Arizona State University wraps up the dialogue with 
this: 
"Let teachers of college English teach structure, function, and 
meaning of language. Let them teach collegians how to think 
through writing. Let pedagogues teach what they know -about 
schools, adolescents, and instruction. Then let a few, brilliant 
English teachers teach how to teach English to adolescents." 
However it is to be achieved, the proper preparation of 
schoolteachers . demands the collaboration of these estranged 
professoriates. Carl J. Dolce, dean of the School of Education at 
North Carolina State University and a CBE director, makes the 
point in a recent position paper: "Academically inept teachers are 
graduates of colleges and universities, and not just of teacher 
education programs ... Teacher quality failures are really failures 
of an entire institution." 
It is the universities' responsibility to foster collaboration; and as 
long as certification is a function of state authority, the states must 
make sure that universities and colleges meet that responsibility. 
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